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APOLLO EXPERl ENCE REPORT 
EARTH LAND I NG SYSTEM 
By Robert B. West 
Lyndon 6. Johnson Space Center 
SUMMARY 
The Apollo earth landing system operational requirements were defined through 
detailed reviews of the total-mission environments associated with both normal atmos- 
pheric entry and the various abort contingencies. These operational requirements and 
the necessity for compatible interface with the command module dictated the basic de- 
sign and performance requirements of the earth landing system. For example, the high 
recovery weight of the command module ruled out the use of a single main-parachute 
system because of the lack of experience with single parachutes in  a size needed to 
recover the spacecraft within the limitations placed on the rate of descent. In addition, 
the Apollo upper-deck structure presented formidable problems for packing and install- 
ing a single parachute of the required size. 
Although much was known relative to the system requirements during the initial 
phases of the program, considerably more knowledge was gained during the course of 
the development program. The more significant problems encountered during the de- 
velopment of the Apollo earth landing system, the solutions, and the general knowledge 
gained from having encountered these problems a r e  discussed. A brief description of 
the Block I, Block II, and Increased Capability Block II systems and a summary of the 
test programs that were conducted are included. 
INTRODUCTI ON 
In January 1962, the original specifications were released for a parachute recov- 
ery system to be incorporated on the Apollo command module (CM). The original pro- 
gram to develop and to provide this system was anticipated to extend over a period of 
13 months; however, the final Apollo earth landing system (ELS) qualification test was  
not completed until July 1968. Then the system was considered suitable for manned 
lunar missions. 
Early in  the Apollo Program, the fact was recognized that, to accomplish the 
lunar-landing mission, certain major changes would have to be made to the initial CM 
design, In consideration of program cost and schedular, a decision was  made to con- 
tinue the original CM configuration (then designated as Block I) through the initial 
earth-orbital system-verification flights. At the same time, a Block 11 program was 
initiated to implement the changes to the CM that were needed to accomplish the lunar- 
landing mission. 
The major differences between the Blocks I and I1 spacecraft affecting the ELS 
were as follows. 
1. The docking tunnel w a s  shortened and the tunnel wall was tapered slightly in- 
ward. This modification significantly changed the shape of the main-parachute stowage 
compartment and necessitated complete redesign of the main-parachute deployment bag 
and the retention system. 
2. A single structural assembly (called the flowerpot) was incorporated to attach 
the two drogue risers and the three main-parachute risers to the CM at a single loca- 
tion. This attachment fitting also served as the housing for the riser disconnects. 
3. The pilot-parachute mortar mounts were moved from the deck of the forward 
compartment and relocated on the side of the gussets. 
4.  The CM uprighting bags were removed from the gusset-mounted containers 
and relocated under the main-parachute packs on the deck. 
The drogue, pilot, and main parachutes remained essentially unchanged f rom the 
Block I configuration except for a length of steel riser incorporated in the lower end of 
the main-parachute riser for protection from abrasion. After the spacecraft 012 f i re ,  
many modifications were made to the Block I1 CM, resulting in a significant increase 
in vehicle weight. Analysis indicated that the projected weight increase would result 
in parachute loads greater than those that either the ELS or the CM structure was 
capable of withstanding safely. Therefore, in mid-1967, a program was initiated to 
increase the capability of the ELS and to reduce the main-parachute loads to acceptable 
levels with the greater CM weight. The major changes made to the ELS during this 
program were as  follows. 
1. The main-parachute reefing system was modified to incorporate an additional 
stage in the inflation process to reduce the peak opening loads. 
2. The diameter of the drogue parachutes was increased to reduce the dynamic- 
pressure conditions and to provide a more stable vehicle at the time of main-parachute 
deployment. 
3. The size of the drogue-parachute mortar was increased to provide the addi- 
tional volume required by the larger drogue parachute. 
4 .  The parachute reefing-line-cutter time-delay was modified to obtain delay 
times of 6 and 10 seconds for the two-stage main-parachute reefing system. 
The various components of the Block I ,  Block 11, and Increased Capability 
Block 11 systems a r e  discussed in  detail in appendix A. In appendix B the test pro- 
grams that were conducted to develop and to qualify the ELS are outlined. 
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FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION 
The ELS consists of the various parachutes and related components necessary to 
stabilize and to decelerate the CM to conditions that a r e  safe for landing. The ELS was 
designed to recover the CM after either a normal entry o r  a launch abort. Nine para- 
chutes are installed on the CM all of which function during the recovery sequence. 
Three main parachutes, three pilot parachutes, two drogue parachutes, and a forward- 
heat- shield-separation-augmentation parachute are included. 
The recovery sequence is initiated automatically through the closure of baro- 
metric switches o r  through the function of time-delay relays. A logic diagram illus- 
trating each of the ELS functions is presented in figure 1. A normal-entry or 
high-altitude-abort recovery sequence begins with the jettisoning of the forward heat 
shield at a nominal altitude of 24 000 feet (fig. 2). Immediately after separation of the 
System 
System 
24 O W f t  
baroswitches 
Drogue- 
parachute 
disconnect 
A 
E 
TD = t ime  
11 am-n 
baroswitches 
Crew :I$* switch 
(main-parachute ~ ~ i ~ -  
disconnect) parachute 
disconnect 
-delay relay 
Figure 1. - Logic and redundancy in the ELS. 
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Three parachutes - 32 fps %@ 
Two parachutes - 36 fps 
1. Forward heat shield jettisoned at 24 Mx) R 
+0.4 sec 
2. Drogue parachutes deployed reefed at 
3. Drogueparachute single-stage disreef, 
4. Drogue parachutes jettisoned and main 
5. Main-parachute initial inflation 
6. Main-parachute first-stage disreef, 
6 sec 
7.  vhf recoveryantennas and flashing 
beacon deployed, 8 sec 
8. Main-parachute second-stagedisreef, 
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9. Main parachutes released 
24 OOO A +2 sec 
10 sec 
parachutes deployed by pilot para- 
chutes at 11 M)o A 
heat shield from the CM, a small, 7.2-foot- 
diameter parachute is mortar-deployed from 
the forward heat shield. This parachute ex- 
erts a force to extract the jettisoned heat 
shield from the wake of the CM. Two 
16.5-foot-diameter conical ribbon drogue 
parachutes are mortar-deployed 1.6 sec- 
onds after f orward-heat- shield jettison. 
The drogue parachutes undergo a 10-second 
reefed interval before disreefing to full 
open, and remain attached to the CM to an 
altitude of approximately 11 000 feet. At 
drogue disconnect, three 7.2-foot-diameter 
ringslot pilot parachutes are mortar- 
deployed. The pilot parachutes then pro- 
vide the force necessary to release the 
main-parachute retention system and to 
extract the main-parachute -3ck assemblies. 
The main-parachute packs &re then pulled 
away from the CM and the three 83.5-foot- 
diameter main parachutes are extracted 
from the deployment bags. Each main para- 
chute then inflates through two reefing stages 
to a full-open condition. 
Figure 2. - Normal recovery sequence. If a launch abort should occur and 
tude attained is below the opening altitude of the baroswitches, forward-heat-shield 
jettison and deployment of the drogue and pilot parachutes occur on a timed sequence, 
controlled by the time-delay relays. The events that occur during a launch abort are 
illustrated i n  figure 3. 
conditions are such that the maximum alti- 
Arm ELS and jettison launch escape S I GN I FI CANT PROBLEMS tower, boost protective cover, and 
docking ring (14 secl 
Drogue parachutes 
deployed (16 secl forward heat shield 
jettisoned (14 4 sed Throughout the ELS developmental 8 program, emphasis w a s  placed on provid- 
Mainparachutes ing a CM recovery system capable of func- 
tioning properly under extremely severe 
flight conditions. At  the same time, the de- 
mands placed on the system in te rms  of vehi- 
cle recovery weight, component stowage, and 
vehicle interface requirements continued 
to grow. During the program, extreme 
measures appeared to be necessary in te rms  
of system or  spacecraft redesign to satisfy 
the requirements imposed on the recovery 
Canards deployed 
111 secl 
[ - ) + c )  
Launch escape 
motor ignited 
Figure 3. - Pad- and low-altitude- 
abort sequence. 
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system. Through the applied efforts of the various groups and agencies associated with 
the system, these problems were resolved with minimum design changes and with the 
least impact on the Apollo Program. 
~ 
I 
In addition to resolving difficult design problems, devising and optimizing compo- 
nent manufacturing and assembling techniques were also necessary to ensure that each 
part  would function properly once it was assembled and installed on the spacecraft. On 
none of the previous space programs w a s  it necessary to contain the parachutes in  the 
limited volumes and in the irregular shapes necessary in the Apollo Program. This 
requirement necessitated the development of precise techniques for packing the para- 
chutes at very high densities without inflicting damage that could propagate during de- 
ployment. The incorporation of steel cable as an integral part of the parachute risers 
required the development of stowage techniques that would provide assurance that the 
cable deployed consistently and safely. 
, 
m 
I 
In addition to stringent program requirements, several specific technical prob- 
lems, the solution of which required the development of innovative methods and tech- 
niques, were encountered. In the following section, the more significant problems 
encountered, their solutions, and the knowledge gained are discussed. 
~ 
tained on two of the three tests and because 
of the first announcement of a CM weight 
Command Module Weight I ncrease 
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Figure 5 .  - Increases in  CM recovery 
weight. 
created new problems because of limited 
stowage volume. Shortly after the start 
of main-parachute-cluster tests , modifica- 
tions had to be made to the main parachutes 
to change their opening characteristics to 
achieve more evenly balanced load sharing 
among the parachutes , thereby reducing the 
peak opening loads, 
By the time the Block I ELS had com- 
pleted qualification, each system of the 
spacecraft had progressed to the point at 
which accurate total-weight estimates were 
available. Although the maximum projected 
weight for a Block II spacecraft was above 
the specification values, the overweight 
condition was not sufficient to justify major design changes in the ELS. Therefore, 
the Block II program was pursued as a minimum-change effort. 
During the months immediately following the spacecraft 012 accident, numerous 
modifications were made to the CM. By mid-April 1967, weight estimates indicated 
that the projected weight of the spacecraft had increased to a value greater than that at 
which the ELS could recover the CM with an acceptable safety margin. The CM recov- 
ery weight possibly could increase to as much as 13 000 pounds, which, in  turn, would 
increase the parachute loads to levels unacceptable for the parachutes and the CM 
structure. 
The implemented solution consisted of increasing the size of the drogue para- 
chutes and of providing the existing main parachutes with an additional reefing stage. 
The larger drogue parachutes and the additional main-parachute reefing stage were 
necessary to ensure adequate safety factors for the parachutes and the CM structure at 
the 13 000-pound recovery weight. Larger drogue parachutes on the heavier CM re- 
duced the dynamic pressure at drogue disconnect/pilot mortar fire to a level near that 
of the smaller drogue parachutes on the lighter spacecraft. The additional reefing 
stage i n  the main parachutes reduced the individual and total main-parachute loads to 
values no greater than the design loads for an 11 000-pound CM. 
On July 31, 1967, a program was approved to implement these changes to the 
ELS to become effective on the first Block II spacecraft (CSM 101). At the beginning 
of the improvement program, very few data were available to provide a basis for  a 
detailed analysis of two-stage main-parachute reefing. Therefore, aerial drop tests 
had to be conducted early in the program. These tests generated the preliminary per- 
formance data that were used to establish reefing parameters and to  support an evalua- 
tion Of the adequacy of the existing main-parachute design. From these initial tests, 
two-stage reefing w a s  proved feasible and the existing main-parachute design was  
proved structurally adequate with the higher CM e i g h t .  Reefed intervals of 6 seconds 
in the first stage and an additional 4 seconds i n  the second stage of inflation were se- 
lected. These reefed intervals provided nearly uniform loading in  each stage and added 
only 2 seconds to the total inflation time of the earlier single-stage reefing system. 
The new reefing-time-delay requirement was then factored into the development of a 
6 
reefing cutter. In conjunction with the main-parachute-design changes, definition of the 
maximum volume available for larger drogue-parachute mortars became necessary be- 
cause the size of the drogue parachute was  limited primarily by the size of the mortar 
tubes that could be fitted to the spacecraft. Volume was  made available for mortars 
accommodating 16.5-foot-diameter drogue parachutes. 
Because the Block 11 schedule required delivery of parachutes for installation on 
spacecraft 101 (Apollo 7 mission) by mid-November 1967, the Increased Capability 
Block 11 program was recognized as a high-risk effort in terms of potentially delaying 
the first Block 11 flight. Therefore, the total effort was afforded a high priority and 
received the utmost support at all levels. Considering the schedule requirements, the 
plan was to deliver the first production system for installation on spacecraft 101; the 
followup system, which would be identical in configuration, was scheduled to support 
the system-qualification aerial drop test. Satisfactory completion of the total system- 
qualification effort was  placed as a constraint on the Apollo 7 mission. 
The main-parachute design-limit loads defined for the Block 11 11 000-pound CM 
and the design-limit loads for the final Block 11 main parachutes with the 13 000-pound 
CM are presented in table I. These load values provide an indication of the effective- 
ness of the changes made to the Block II system. This table should not be used as a 
direct comparative evaluation of the changes, because data obtained during the Increased 
Capability Block 11 program allowed for considerable refinement of the parameters used 
in establishing the design-load values. The changes that were made to the ELS effec- 
tively counteracted the increase in CM weight and accomplished the required reduction 
in main-parachute loads. 
TABLE I. - MAIN-PARACHUTE DESIGN LOADS 
Parachute configurations 
Individual 
Fir st stage 
Second stage 
Full open 
Design loads, lb 
(a 
Original Block 11 ELS 
with 11 000-lb CM 
2 1  800 
24 700 
I Total cluster I 39 000 
Final Block I1 ELS 
with 13 000-lb CM 
22 000 
23 800 
22 900 
37 500 
a These values should not be used for direct comparison. 
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Main-Parachute-Cluster I nterference 
On November 27, 1962, the first aerial  drop test  was made using a parachute test 
vehicle (PTV) to investigate the performance characteristics of a cluster of three inde- 
pendently deployed 88.1-foot-diameter ringsail main parachutes. For the initial test, 
the vehicle w a s  ballasted to only 4750 pounds, one-half the weight of the CM. The con- 
figuration of the parachute test specimens and the related components represented the 
then-current spacecraft design. Deployment of the main parachutes was achieved by 
simultaneously mor tar  - dep loy ed pi lot parachutes . 
The results of this test indicated a significant problem relative to the deployment 
behavior of clustered ringsail parachutes and eventually led to some unique design fea- 
tures in  the main parachutes. The three ringsail parachutes inflated in a nonsynchro- 
nous manner, that is, one canopy inflated rapidly and inhibited the filling of the lagging 
parachutes. This behavior was most pronounced during the inflation following disreef . 
This crowding effect and nonsynchronous inflation, often referred to as cluster inter- 
ference, was not a new phenomenon but was unusually pronounced with the ringsail de- 
sign. This uneven load sharing resulted in abnormally high opening loads on the 
leading parachute in  the cluster. 
The approach taken to correct this condition was to explore modifications that 
would reduce the rate of inflation of the parachute. Much of this rapid inflation of the 
ringsail parachute w a s  attributed to a characteristic of the canopy to continue to fill 
during the reefed interval and thus produce a large reefed shape with internal pressures 
throughout a large portion of the canopy. This characteristic, in  turn, contributed to a 
rapid full-open inflation following disreef. The flow of air around the large bulbous 
shape of a rapidly developed leading parachute w a s  also noted to have a distorting ef- 
fect on the adjacent lagging parachutes and to greatly inhibit the inflation in the reefed 
condition. 
The modificatioh demonstrating the most favorable effect in reducing the cluster 
interference was the removal of 75 percent of the material from the fifth ring of the 
canopy, thereby forming an open ring around the periphery of the crown. This open 
ring limited canopy growth in the reefed condition to a more cigar-like profile and pro- 
duced near-uniform growth of each of the three main parachutes during reefed and dis- 
reefed inflation. A second change, greatly improving the shape of the lower skirt  area 
and allowing a more efficient inflow of air into all three parachutes, was the relocation 
of the reefing rings on the skirt band from the radial seam-attachment point to a point 
on the skirt band in the middle of the gore (referred to as midgore reefing). 
Based on test results obtained during this same effort, a decision was also made 
to remove four complete gores from the main-parachute canopy to reduce weight. This 
modification produced the basic 68-gore-configuration main parachute that would even- 
tually be flown on Apollo spacecraft. 
The combination of reduced peak opening loads and the removal of material re- 
sulted in  a net allowable weight saving of approximately 45 pounds i n  the main para- 
chute and harness assembly without exceeding the specified maximum rate  of descent 
of 33 fps  at 5000-foot pressure altitude. The open-ring-configuration main parachutes 
also reduced the system oscillations of the two-parachute cluster configuration from 
approximately t 20" to t So, causing a reduction i n  landing hazards. 
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Parachute Riser Abrasion 
On September 6, 1962, during the fifth total-system developmental test, using the 
boilerplate (BP) 3 test vehicle, a ser ies  of events occurred that resulted in separation 
of the main parachutes and loss of the vehicle. The BP failed to stabilize during the 
drogue-parachute interval, and the pilot mortars fired with the vehicle in an apex- 
forward (approximately 60 ") flight attitude. The existing main-parachute r i se rs ,  which 
were joined at a confluence above the vehicle, hung under the airlock with the vehicle 
in  this flight attitude. This anomaly prevented full deployment of the harness until the 
vehicle rotated to a more favorable attitude. The parachute opening loads were trans- 
mitted through the unprotected textile harness legs directly into the gussets and the air- 
lock structure, promptly severing the harness legs. 
After this test, the main-parachute harness assembly w a s  completely redesigned 
to preclude the possibility of its hanging during deployment. The test also made evident 
the fact that the parachute system had to be capable of deployment from an unstable o r  
oscillating CM. To provide this capability, steps were taken to minimize the number 
of areas on the vehicle that could cause cutting and abrasion to the parachute r i se rs .  
Because of requirements external to the ELS, relocation of certain items of spacecraft 
equipment o r  provision of a surrounding structure that would not cause damage to the 
fabric r i s e r s  was not possible. It was necessary to provide risers with a high degree 
of abrasive resistance. 
Investigation of various types of protective sleeving resulted in  the selection of 
Dacron felt with wire-braid covering and resin impregnation for the Block I main- 
parachute attachment harness. The required degree of protection and the required 
flexibility for stowage and deployment ruled out this approach for the drogue- and pilot- 
parachute risers. Thus, the decision was made to pursue the development of steel 
cable risers to provide the necessary abrasion resistance in  the lower portion of the 
risers where there was high probability of contact with the CM structure. 
The incorporation of the flowerpot parachute attachment and the disconnect fitting 
on the Block I1 spacecraft made redesigning the main-parachute risers necessary 
(fig. 6). The flowerpot concept brought the two drogue-parachute r i s e r s  and the three 
main-parachute risers into a common fitting. This concept reduced the available 
volume and eliminated the possibility of using the bulky Block I-type protected-fabric 
riser on the Block 11 spacecraft. Stowage tests on a Block I1 upper-deck mockup indi- 
cated that steel-cable main-parachute r i s e r s  could be incorporated and stowed in  a 
manner assuring orderly deployment. Because the steel-cable main-parachute riser 
provided a solution to the Block 11 volume problem and afforded the necessary resist- 
ance to abrasion, the decision was made to incorporate it in  the Block 11 system. 
Developmental tests on the drogue- and pilot-parachute systems incorporating 
steel-riser segments demonstrated that the cable risers could be stowed with the para- 
chute in  the mortar tube. A major problem i n  using steel cable w a s  the possibility of 
kinks developing during deployment and seriously degrading the strength of the r i se r .  
Some kinking was experienced in  early developmental mortar firings; however, reverse 
twisting of the cable while i t  was  being stowed and a modification to the cable-end fitting 
eliminated the problem. 
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SectionAA 
Figure 6. - Parachute attachment and 
disconnect fitting. 
In several of the Block I1 aerial  drop 
tests incorporating the flowerpot parachute 
attachment fitting, numerous cable strands 
were damaged on the drogue risers. This 
damage occurred in the portion of the cable 
riser that contacted the lip of the flowerpot 
fitting while the vehicle was  oscillating and 
the parachute loads were high. 
Laboratory tests were conducted to 
simulate the dynamics between the drogue 
steel-cable riser and the flowerpot fitting 
with loads applied to the r i se r .  A s  the 
parachute loads were applied through the 
riser over the lip of the flowerpot, these 
tests revealed sufficient deflection in  the 
flowerpot lip to cause a local misalinement 
between the two halves, resulting in  a slight 
ridge over which the cable was abraded. 
Abrasion was  also caused when the four 
strands of cable in a r i se r  arranged them- 
selves such that one cable would be loaded 
across  another while bent over the lip of 
the flowerpot. 
A 4-inch-wide band of lead tape, wrapped around each of the drogue riser cables 
where they crossed the lip of the flowerpot, provided excellent protection from abra- 
sion and proved to be a simple and an effective solution to the problem. In the Blocks I 
and 11 systems, the steel-cable parachute risers proved an acceptable design and func- 
tioned correctly on all tests and flights. 
Main-Parachute Canopy Strength I ncrease 
During the second aer ia l  drop test in the original Block II developmental test 
ser ies ,  a significant deficiency w a s  found in  the structural  capability of the main- 
parachute canopy. The test was established to demonstrate the deployment character- 
ist ics of the main parachute at a full-open limit-load condition following deployment 
f rom the Block 11 deployment bag. The main-parachute design remained unchanged be- 
tween Blocks I and II; there was little concern about the structural capability of the 
main parachute because it had been demonstrated at ultimate-load conditions in excess 
Of 33 000 pounds during the Block I qualification program. During this test, however, 
a complete gore was split from the skirt band to the vent band of the main parachute 
under an axial load between 20 000 and 23 000 pounds while inflating from disreef to 
full open. Although the parachute design previously had been subjected to significantly 
higher loads following disreef, a post-test investigation revealed that it had never been 
exposed to the conditions of this particular test. 
Because of the inherent inflation characteristics of the main parachute, the con- 
ditions of this test produced much higher local-stress levels in  the canopy skirt than 
were experienced with conditions at a much higher axial load on previous tests. This 
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deficiency was corrected by the addition of circumferential reinforcing tapes to 
strengthen the canopy (fig. 7). This test failure clearly illustrated the necessity for 
demonstrating the inflation characteristics and the strength of the parachutes over the 
entire range of possible operating conditions. 
Volume of main- 
parachute pack 
assembly, cu in. 
1-in 900-lb tape at 
trailing edge of ring 
9, one tape on in- 
side. one tape on 
1-in. 900-lb tape at 
trailing edge of ring 5 
Net usable Volumetric efficiency Main-parachute 
volume, of parachute pack, pack density, 
cu in. percent lb/cu in. 
Figure 7. - Main-parachute 
reinforcement. 
High-Density Parachute Packing 
During the Blocks I and 11 ELS develop- 
mental programs, many modifications in- 
volving added material were made to the 
parachutes. However, increase in  available 
stowage volume for the parachutes on the 
spacecraft was minimal. Early in the 
Block I program, the more conventional 
hand-packing techniques had to be replaced 
by machine-assisted pressure packing to 
stow the parachutes in the available volumes. 
The volumetric requirements for the 
Blocks I and I1 main parachutes are depicted 
i n  table II. As  the density of the parachute 
packs increased, the amount of damage to 
the parachutes also increased. 
The general procedure followed in 
packing the parachutes involved supporting 
the parachute deployment bag in  a rigid 
metal container and progressively folding 
first the canopy and then the suspension lines into the deployment bag. In pressure 
packing the parachutes, a r am force was applied to the partially stowed parachute to 
press  it into the deployment bag. Because a high percentage of the main parachute is 
fabricated from lightweight (1.1 ounce) nylon cloth and because the parachute also con- 
tains numerous metal reefing-line cutters and reefing rings, i t  was particularly sus- 
ceptible to damage by pressure packing. Layers of cloth would tend to be pinched 
between metal parts,  causing cuts and tears ,  and the pressure applied to the cloth 
would cause strained seams, friction burns, and weave separations. 
TABLE II. - VOLUMETRIC REQUIREMENTS OF MAIN-PARACHUTE PACK 
ELS test 
programs 
Block I 
Block II 
Increased 
Capability 
Block I1 
5089 
5 500 
5500 
6808 
6925 
6925 
74.8 
79.4 
79.4 
0.0239 
.0241 
.0247 
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Because of the damage being sustained, a concerted effort w a s  made to design 
handling equipment and to establish procedures minimizing packing damage. During 
this effort, approximately 70 trial parachute-packing operations were performed, in 
addition to the parachute packing that was being accomplished to support the develop- 
mental aerial drop tests. Steps taken to correct this problem were as follows. 
1. Several basic deployment-bag designs were tried with many modifications to 
each design. A Teflon-impregnated cloth liner was used in the deployment bag to re- 
duce friction between the parachute and the bag. 
2. A high-pressure packing ram was  developed with rotating pressure feet, 
swivel-mounted hydraulic cylinders, and other special features designed to aid packing. 
3. The design of the packing pressure feet and protective pads was modified 
many times. 
4. A high-capacity vacuum system was used as an integral part of the packing 
container to evacuate air from the folds of cloth during packing. 
5. Several packing-container designs were tried with many modifications to 
each design. 
6. Packing-container inserts were designed to gain subtle changes in pack 
contours. 
7. Various lubricants (Teflon spray, Tef lon-coated cloth, et cetera) were used 
on the walls of the packing container to aid in packing under pressure.  
8. Variations in packing pressure and in soak times were introduced at various 
stages in the packing process. 
9. Combinations of high and low packing pressures  were introduced at various 
stages during the packing process. 
10. Changes were made in the design of the reefing rings and in the method of 
placing them in  the deployment bag. 
11. Padded reefing-cutter packets were developed and incorporated into the 
parachutes. 
Because of the high densities achieved and because of the tendency for the para- 
chute packs to expand when removed from the packing container, form blocks and 
vacuum packaging were necessary for storage of the parachute packs to ensure a proper 
fit of the parachute pack during installation on the spacecraft. 
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The high-density parachute-packing equipment and the procedures developed and 
refined throughout the program allowed for maximum use of the available stowage 
volume on the spacecraft. Although minor packing damage (small cuts and burns) is 
still present, it is reduced to a level no longer considered to be a hazard o r  problem 
to the parachutes. 
Fo rwa rd-Heat- Shield Recontact 
During the recovery sequence for spacecraft 009 (Apollo-Saturn (AS) 201), a data- 
acquisition camera mounted in  the CM disclosed a potentially hazardous condition that 
could have had an adverse effect on successful operation of the parachute recovery sys- 
tem. Immediately following the jettison of the forward heat shield, the cover separated 
from the vehicle and then returned toward the upper deck at a relatively high rate. 
Further aerodynamic studies revealed that the forward heat shield jettison system did 
not provide sufficient energy to thrust the heat shield through the strong reverse flow 
present in the wake of a stable CM. To ensure separation of the forward heat shield, 
a conventional pilot-parachute mortar assembly was mounted in the apex of the cover, 
oriented to  fire straight up from the vehicle, and initiated by the same signal that 
initiated thruster firing of the forward heat shield. This modification was never tested 
in  the Block I BP aerial drop tests (they were already completed), but was  tested in a 
ser ies  of ground firings and was incorporated successfully on each of the remaining 
Block I spacecraft. 
Because of the Block I recontact problem, consideration was given to the possi- 
bility that this condition existed on the Block II vehicle. Analysis indicated that recon- 
tact would not occur because of a 30-percent reduction in  the weight of the forward heat 
shield and because of an increase in  thruster output; they combined to provide a separa- 
tion velocity of 45 fps as compared to the Block I value of 24 fps. However, during the 
final BP aer ia l  drop test in the original Block 11 ELS qualification program, onboard 
cameras revealed that the same condition previously encountered on the Block I AS 201 
flight was again present i n  the Block II system. 
The Block I1 forward heat shield was  captured in the wake of the vehicle, and the 
reverse  flow, which was  stronger than anticipated, forced it back toward the parachute 
compartment. Because this condition represented a serious hazard to the ELS, appro- 
priate corrective action was again taken through the addition of a Block 11 forward-heat- 
shield-separation-augmentation parachute system (fig. 8). 
Because this condition was observed on the final qualification drop test for the 
original Block II system, and because no unmanned Block 11 flights were scheduled, 
concern was focused on a method to demonstrate the fix. This problem was resolved 
when the Increased Capability ELS program provided a means of evaluating +he per- 
f ormance of the forward-heat-shield- separation- augmentation system during total- 
system aerial drop tests. 
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Parachute pack Forward-heat-sh ield 
jettison system 
Redundant Two cartridges 
-Y ’ L L a n d y a r d  system 
Lanyard 
Electrical harness 
Disconnect 
Redundant 
Figure 8. - Block II forward-heat- 
shield parachute system. 
Mai n-Parachute Oxidizer 
B u r n  Damage 
One Block I AS 202 main parachute, 
retrieved following the spacecraft landing, 
revealed many small  burn holes throughout 
the canopy and suspension lines. Labora- 
tory analysis revealed that the parachute 
had been damaged by nitrogen tetroxide 
(N204) expelled from the CM reaction con- 
t rol  system (RCS). The postflight investi- 
gation disclosed that the ratio of fuel and 
oxidizer carried in  the CM was such that, 
during the burn and dump modes (used to 
purge the RCS after main-parachute deploy- 
ment), the fuel was depleted before the oxi- 
dizer, causing raw oxidizer to be dumped 
into the air stream. The N204, which is 
very damaging to nylon parachute material, 
was then sufficiently concentrated on the 
parachute to burn many small  holes. This 
condition was corrected on subsequent missions by controlling the- ratio of fuel and oxi- 
dizer loaded on the CM to ensure that the oxidizer would be depleted before the fuel 
during the burn mode. Thus, only the fuel remained, and it does not react chemically 
so as to degrade the strength of the nylon. 
An anomaly occurring during the recovery of the Apollo 15 CM caused one of the 
three main parachutes to collapse during the final descent. The posff light investigation 
revealed three potential causes for the anomaly: (1) a possible collision of the jetti- 
soned forward heat shield with the main parachute, (2) a failure of the suspension line 
to the r iser  connector links, and (3) RCS fuel burning the fabric riser or  suspension 
lines. This investigation was seriously hampered because only one of the three main 
parachutes was recovered following the landing, and the recovered parachute was not 
the parachute that collapsed. Secondly, an onboard camera that clearly showed the 
sequence of the parachute deployment was turned off just before the failure occurred. 
After a thorough analysis of the existing data, and after considerable testing, the 
following conclusions were reached, 
1. Although it passed very close to the descending spacecraft, the forward heat 
shield did not contact the Apollo 15 main parachute. 
2 .  Although faulty connector links were found in the recovered main parachute, 
failure of connector links did not cause the main parachute to collapse. 
3. The most probable cause of the anomaly was burning monomethyl hydrazine 
(expelled from the CM RCS) coming in contact with the main-parachute fabric riser. 
A complete description of this anomaly and the subsequent findings and corrective ac- 
tions a r e  presented as appendix C. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The performance of the ELS during many rigorous tests, and the performance of 
each component of the ELS during the spacecraft flights proved that the program objec- 
tives had been met. A parachute-recovery system was provided that satisfied the mis- 
sion requirements, was compatible with the physical characteristics of the vehicle, and 
had a high degree of reliability. The increasingly severe demands placed on the ELS 
in  te rms  of recovery weight, limited stowage volume, and a wide range of initial con- 
ditions were met and resolved without undue impact on the overall Apollo Program. 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, July 2, 1973 
914-11-00-00-72 
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APPENDIX A 
DESCRI PTION OF ELS COMPONENTS 
The basic system concept of the ELS changed little throughout the program from 
that described in the original statement of work. However, the individual components 
of the system underwent numerous changes as the program progressed through the 
Block I and 11 phases. The following is a brief description of the major components of 
the Block I, Block 11, and Increased Capability Block II ELS. 
BLOCK I ELS 
The original parachute system consisted of a single, mortar-deployed, 13. 7-foot- 
diameter, 25" conical-ribbon drogue parachute which was attached to the CM in the 
- Z  quadrant of the forward compartment by a 56.75-foot fabric riser and three mortar- 
deployed, 10-foot-diameter , ringslot-type pilot parachutes, used to extract and deploy 
three 88.1-foot-diameter ringsail main parachutes. The main parachutes were joined 
at a confluence fitting 62 inches above the CM. This fitting was attached to the CM by 
four harness legs that suspended the spacecraft from points located at the top of the 
forward-compartment gussets. Originally, a main-parachute disconnect was to be 
contained in  this confluence fitting. 
Problems such as vehicle weight increase, main-parachute inflation anomalies, 
and r i se r  abrasion resulted in many modifications to components of the Block I ELS. 
The Block I system flown on the first Apollo spacecraft is illustrated in figure A-1. 
This system used two mortar-deployed drogue parachutes, attached by steel- cable 
r i se rs  to a single disconnect fitting. Three mortar-deployed pilot parachutes extracted 
Figure A-1. - Block I ELS installation. 
A- 1 
the three main parachutes that were connected by fabric r i se rs  to a single confluence 
fitting. 
mounted, main- parachute disconnects. 
Two harness legs extended from the confluence fitting down to two upper-deck- 
Drogue-Parachute Systems 
The drogue parachute, a 13.7-foot-diameter conical ribbon type, was actively 
reefed to  39.3 percent of its nominal diameter by redundant reefing lines with two 
8-second reefing cutters per line. This parachute is illustrated in figure A-2. The 
drogue-parachute mortar assembly is illustrated in figure A-3. An electric current 
first initiates burning of pyrotechnics in the pressure cartridges. Expanding gases 
then flow from the breech assembly through a restrictor and into the drogue mortar 
tube. As the gas pressure increases in the tube, the sabot assembly, acting as a 
piston, ejects the drogue-parachute pack assembly into the airstream. The inertia in 
the system, and the airloads, cause the drogue parachute to be extracted from the 
deployment bag; the steel-cable portion of the riser, contained in a polyurethane foam 
ring, breaks out of the foamed ring and uncoils. The parachute then goes through a 
n o r i a l  inflation process. 
- 
Deployment bag, 
t t  m-drogue parachute 
Nominal diameter: 13.7 ft 
No. olgores; 16 
Constructed porosity: 23 percent 
Reeling duration: 8 sec 
Drag area reefed: 41 ft2 
Drag area disreefed: 68 $ 
Surface area: 146 t12 
1 
~ 
Figure A-2. - Block I drogue parachute. 
-Cover 
Ring, foamed rise;- 
/ 
\ -s Restrictor 
Pressure cartridge 
Figure A-3. - Block I drogue-parachute 
mortar assembly. 
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P il ot- Pa rac h Ute System 
1 
The pilot parachute, which extracts and deploys the main parachute, is illustrated 
in  figure A-4. This was a 7.2-foot-diameter ringslot design permanently attached to 
the main parachute and main-parachute deployment bag. The pilot-parachute mortar,  
pack assembly, and related components are illustrated in figure A-5. As with the 
drogue system, the pilot parachute was deployed through the action of expanding gas in 
the mortar tube. The pilot parachute then 
provided the force required to release the 
main-parachute retention system and ex- 
tract  the main-parachute pack from the CM. 
Parachute type r ingslot  
Nominal diameter 7 2 fl 
No of gores 17 
Constructed porosi ty 22 percent 
@rag area 24 4 ft2 
Figure A-4. - Block I pilot parachute. 
Ring, foamed r iser  - \\ -h  
Pack assembly 
Sabot assembly 
Breech 
1 J-Tube assembly 
%pilot pressure 
cartridge 
Figure A-5. - Block I pilot-parachute 
mortar assembly. 
Mai n- Pa rach ute System 
The main-parachute system consisted of the three main parachutes, three main- 
parachute retention assemblies, a main-parachute harness assembly, and two main-. 
parachute .attachment fittings. The Block I main parachute was an 83.5-foot-diameter 
ringsail design, actively reefed to 9.5 percent of i ts  nominal diameter by redundant 
reefing lines with three 8-second reefing cutters per line. The final Block I main para- 
chute is illustrated in figure A-6 (DR = diameter reefed). The main parachute was  
packed in a deployment bag retained on the upper deck of the CMagainsttheairlock wall 
by the main-parachute retention-flaps assembly (fig. A-7) .  Force exerted by the pilot 
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- 
0 Ib 
Deployment bag, 
main parachute 
7.25 Ib I 1 -  
29.25 I 
1 
No. of gores: 68 
Calculated total porosity: 12 percent 
Reefing: 7 . 9  R DR (9.5 percent midgore) 
Reefing duration: 8 sec 
Drag area reefed: 353 ftZ 
Drag area disreefd: 4MxJ ft2 
Center flap ?-- 
I 
Figure A-7. - Block I main-parachute 
retention assembly. 
parachute released a chain lace securing the 
retention-assembly center panel to the two 
side flaps and to the upper flap. Release of 
the chain lace allowed the center flap to open 
outward and release the main-parachute pack. 
As the pilot parachute lifted the main- 
parachute pack away from the vehicle, the 
main parachute was extracted from the de- 
ployment bag in an orderly manner beginning 
with the connector links, followed by the 
suspension lines, and finally by the canopy. 
Figure A-6. - Block I main parachute. 
M a i n  -Pa rac h Ute Ha rness Assembly 
Two harness legs and a confluence fitting constituted the main-parachute harness 
assembly. The harness assembly served as a bridge between the three main-parachute 
risers and the harness-attachment fittings.of the vehicle. The main-parachute harness 
assembly is illustrated in  figure A-8. 
A- 4 
Riser to main-oarachute n M a i n  -Pa rac h Ute Attach ment Fitting v/ pack, +Z bay Riser to main- parachute pack, 
Figure A-8. - Block I main-parachute 
harness assembly. 
Disconnect 
pressure cartridg  A \ 
vehicle 
harness 
Figure A-9. - Block I main-parachute 
attachment and disconnect fitting. 
The two main-parachute attachment 
fittings were located on the upper deck of 
the C M  at the base of longerons 3 and 4. 
Each of the two fittings was capable of with- 
standing the total opening loads generated 
by the three main parachutes. A main- 
parachute-harness disconnect wasincorpo- 
rated into each of these attachment fittings. 
This unit included a pyrotechnic pressure 
cartridge which, when initiated, drove a 
sharp blade into the harness retaining pin, 
severing that leg of the harness and releas- 
ing it from the vehicle. The main-parachute 
attachment fitting and harness disconnect 
are  illustrated in figure A-9. As a safety 
feature, the two disconnects received their 
current from two separate electrical 
sources; thus, an inadvertent premature 
signal would disconnect only one leg of the 
harness, and the main parachutes would 
remain attached to the CM through the other 
leg. 
Reefing Cutters 
The 8-second reefing-line cutters 
used in  the Block I drogue and main para- 
chutes were identical and interchangeable. 
The reefing cutters were used to sever the 
reefing line, which limited the inflated di- 
ameter of the parachute for a predeter- 
mined time, thus reducing the parachute 
opening loads. 
The reefing cutters (fig. A-10) were 
contained i n  cutter pockets sewed to the 
skirt of the parachute. A lanyard was then 
attached from the reefing-cutter shear pin 
to a suspension line on the parachute. Ten- 
sion in  the suspension line caused the lan- 
yard to extract the cutter shear pin, cocking 
and releasing the cutter firing pin. The 
firing pin then struck and detonated a 
primer that ignited an 8-second pyrotechnic 
time-delay element in the cutter. At the 
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r M o u n t i n g  ring 
Time-delay compound 
(three to four pressings) 
Expansion chamber 
Figure A- 10. - Reefing-line cutter. 
end of the time-delay burn, a pyrotechnic 
charge ignited and caused a cutter blade to 
sever the reefing line. This same type of 
reefing-line cutter was also used to release 
the VHF recovery antennas and the flashing 
light, allowing them to deploy 8 seconds 
after the main parachutes were deployed. 
BLOCK II ELS 
Changes made to the spacecraft upper 
deck between Blocks I and I1 necessitated 
modification of certain components of the 
ELS. The docking tunnel was shortened 
and the tunnel wall was tapered, significant- 
ly altering the shape of the main-parachute 
stowage compartment. A single flowerpot 
parachute attachment fitting was incorpor- 
ated to replace the drogue-parachute attachment fitting and the two main-parachutk 
deck- mounted attachment fittings. The ELS components affected by these changes in- 
cluded: (1) the main-parachute deployment bag and retention system, (2) the main- 
parachute r iser  assembly, (3) the drogue-parachute cable- riser assembly, and (4) the 
pilot-parachute mortar tube and breech assembly. 
The general arrangement of the Block I1 ELS installed on the upper deck is de- 
picted in figure A- ll. The Block I1 installation used the available volume in the forward 
compartment more efficiently than did the Block I system. The incorporation of the 
flowerpot parachute attachment fitting elim- 
inated the large, bulky, two-leg, main- 
parachute harness assembly and the 
confluence fitting and provided for much 
better stowage of both the main- and drogue- 
parachute r i se rs .  
-Sea recovery 
Main -Parachute Deployment Bag 
and Retention System 
The main-parachute deployment bag 
w a s  generally reconfigured to fit the shape 
of the Block I1 stowage compartment. The 
net result was a Block I1 bag that was 
shorter and wider than the Block I configura- 
incorporation of a side-opening bag instead 
of the Block I bottom-opening deployment 
bag. 
LUprighting bags tion. This change in shape resulted in the 
under main parachutes 
(three places) parachute Parachute mortar 
Figure A-11. - Block I1 ELS general 
arrangement. 
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The Block I main-parachute retention flaps were replaced by a series of fabric- 
covered, spring steel straps attached to the upper-deck structure. These straps were 
then chain-laced by an interlocking length of cord to loops sewed to the face of the main- 
parachute deployment bag (fig. A-12). Because the Block I retention flaps also pro- 
vided environmental/thermal protection for the main parachutes, eliminating these 
flaps necessitated the incorporation of these protective features into the Block II de- 
ployment bag. This task was accomplished by adding a layer of 1/4-inch Dacron felt 
to the walls of the deployment bag. 
Figure A- 12. - Block II main-parachute deployment bag and retention system. 
The Block II main-parachute deployment bag was a significant improvement over 
the Biock I configuration. Because the new end-opening bag provideci a constant cross 
section area as viewed through the open end, it was superior for packing the parachute 
at a high density with minimal packing damage. The elimination of retention flaps re- 
duced the amount of retention lacing and provided a much more efficient installation in 
terms of material required to retain the main-parachute packs on the spacecraft. 
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Block I 1  Parachute Riser Assemblies 
The Block II main parachutes incorporated r i se r  assemblies composed of steel 
cable and fabric that attached each of the three parachutes directly to the CM. The 
steel-cable portion was 80 inches long and was composed of six 0.28-inch-diameter 
cables, assembled with swaged-steel end fittings. These end fittings were designed to 
attach one end of the cable riser to the flowerpot fitting on the CM and to attach the 
other end to the main-parachute fabric r i se r .  The entire cable riser, except the end 
fittings, was encased in a thermally fitted, polyolefin sleeve to maintain the six indi- 
vidual wire cables in their relative positions during stowage and deployment. The 
fabric portion of the main-parachute r i se r  assembly remained generally the same as 
in the Block I configuration, except for a slight reduction in length. 
The drogue-parachute steel riser consisted of three 0.28-inch-diameter cables 
with swaged-steel end fittings. With two exceptions, the basic cable configuration re- 
mained the same for Blocks I and 11. The lower end fitting was redesigned on the 
Block 11 version fo r  compatibility with the CM flowerpot attachment fitting, and the 
basic cable strength was slightly upgraded through selection control to satisfy the 
Block 11 abrasion criteria. 
P i l  ot-P a rac h ute Mo r ta  r Assembly 
The Block I1 pilot-parachute assembly, thermally insulated deployment bag, 
fabric r iser ,  and steel riser were identical to the Block I version. The changes incor- 
porated into the Block 11 pilot-parachute mortar assembly included the following. 
1. The opposing-cartridge breech configuration was replaced by a side-by-side 
cartridge arrangement and an eroding-type orifice to obtain the required muzzle veloc- 
ity within the allowable reaction-load limits. 
2. A s  opposed to the deck-rail installation used on Block I, the mortar-mounting 
provisions were changed to install the pilot mortars on the forward-compartment longe- 
rons. This change allowed for more efficient use of the available volume and provided 
added volume for the main-parachute pack assemblies. 
INCREASED CAPABl L l  TY BLOCK I I ELS 
Because of the increase i n  CM weight, which occurred after completion of quali- 
fication of the original Block I1 ELS, modification of the parachute system was necessary 
to increase i ts  capability to recover the heavier CM. The major changes were associated 
with a redesign of the main-parachute reefing system to achieve a second reefing stage 
and with an increase in the size of the drogue parachutes. A modification was also 
made to the pilot-parachute assembly to assure adequate strength in  the r i se r .  
Although the incorporation of the Block I1 forward-heat-shield-separation- 
augmentation system was not directly associated with the CM weight increase, it was 
also developed and qualified during the Increased Capability Block 11 program. 
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Two- Stage Main  -Pa rach Ute Reefing 
The significant difference between the 
original Block II main parachute and the In- 
creased capability Block II main parachute 
was the incorporation of two-stage reefing. 
The two-stage reefing system, illustrated 
in figure A- 13, reduced the peak opening 
loads generated by each of the main para- 
chutes. The incorporation of the additional 
reefing stage reduced the initial drag area 
present at high-dynamic pressures and then 
allowed the parachute to inflate to a larger 
intermediate drag area before inflating to 
a full-open condition. The first- and 
second-stage disreefings were timed to oc- 
cur as the dynamic pressure decreased to 
near-minimum levels. These times were 
established at 6 and 10 seconds after initial 
parachute deployment, o r  6 and 10 seconds 
after line stretch. 
The two-stage reefing system incor- 
porated dual reefing rings mounted on the 
skirt  of the parachute canopy. The reefing- 
cutter mounting provisions and midgore 
reefing concept remained essentially un- 
changed from the Blocks I and II configura- 
tions. Redundant reefing lines were used 
for the first stage because analysis showed 
that bypassing this stage of inflation could 
generate loads that would destroy the para- 
chute. This redundancy was not needed for 
the second stage; therefore, only a single 
reefing line w a s  incorporated. 
A typical reefing-line installation at 
a first-stage cutter position is illustrated 
in figure A-14. The first-stage reefing 
lines are threaded through the lower holes 
of the reefing rings. One of these lines 
passes through the 6-second cutter in the 
conventional manner; the other line by- 
passes this cutter and passes through iden- 
tical 6-second cutters located on other 
gores. The second-stage reefing line is 
routed through the upper holes of the reef- 
ing rings, bypassing the 6-second cutters 
and passing through 10-second cutters 
mounted in  the same manner on other 
gores. 
Reefin 
l ine B Reefing 
cutter Reefing cutter Reefing 
line A 
First stage Second stage 
Line A - Shorter length (264 in . )  
6-second cutters 
Lonyr  length 1780 in . )  
10-second cutters 
Line B 
Suspension cutter 
line I[
Full open 
Figure A- 13. - Main-parachute 
two-stage reefing. 
Stage U reefing line- 
Figure A- 14. - Reefing-line installation 
for two-stage reefing. 
A-9 
Although single-stage reefing of parachutes has become a rather common practice 
for  reducing opening loads, the use of two-stage reefing was virtually untried before its 
incorporation in the Block 11 system. This system proved to be effective and reliable 
in  reducing the parachute opening load below what otherwise would have been encoun- 
tered because of the increased weight of the CM. The final Block 11 main-parachute 
configuration is illustrated in figure A- 15. 
, 
I 
Deployment bag, 
main parachute 
43.5 i n . 4  TI- 
Mal n 
parachute 
138.5 Ib 
L ink assembly 1.32 Ib  
I I I I 
Nominal diameter: 83.5 ft 
No. ofgores: 68 
Calculated total porosity: 12 percent 
Reefing 
First stage 7.0 ft DR1 (8.4 percent midgore) 
Second stage 20.7 ft DR2 (24.8 percent m i d p i  
First stage 285 ft 
Second stage 1080 f12 
Full o w n :  4200 112 
Drag area (average) 
Figure A- 15. - Final Block II main 
parachute. 
Reefing -C utte r Modification s 
The time intervals of 6 seconds fo r  the 
first  stage and 4 additional seconds fo r  the 
second stage were selected for the reefing 
of the main parachute. Because the relia- 
bility of the mechanical functions of the 
8-second reefing cutters was amply demon- 
strated on the Blocks I and 11 systems, only 
the burning rates  of the pyrotechnic delay 
elements were modified. 
Because two different time-delay reef - 
ing cutters were used in each of the main 
parachutes and because both had an identi- 
cal  physical appearance , the possibility of 
inadvertent interchange of the cutters 
existed. To minimize this possibility, a 
black oxide was applied to the body of the 
6-second first-stage reefing cutters, which, 
in turn, were installed in olive-drab cutter 
pockets of the parachute. The 10-second 
reefing cutters retained the untreated 
finish and were used in natural-colored 
cotton-duck cutter pockets on the parachutes. 
D rogue- P a rac h u te Modification s 
The drogue-parachute design for the 
Increased Capability ELS is a 16. 5-foot- 
diameter, 25" conical-ribbon parachute 
illustrated in  figure A- 16. Except for  the 
increase in  size and subsequent drag area, 
geometric differences in the canopy f rom the original Block I1 design were minimal. 
A comparative summary of the original Block 11 and the Increased Capability Block I1 
drogue-parachute design is presented in  table A-I. 
Several significant departures f rom Block I1 construction methods were used to 
reduce weight, to minimize volume requirements, and to improve certain design fea- 
tures of the parachute. A substantial saving of weight and volume was accomplished 
by using continuous horizontal-ribbon construction in much of the canopy. The use of 
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Deployment bag, 
drogue parachute 
Nominal diameter: 16.5 fl 
No. of gores: 20 
Constructed porosity 22 percent 
Reefed duration: 10 sec 
Drag area reefed: 65 ft2 
continuous ribbons with a single-lap splice 
eliminated the added material previously 
required to make multiple-gore splices. 
A second significant departure from 
the original Block I1 configuration was the 
incorporation of an integrated suspension- 
line/riser design, with an extension of the 
suspension lines forming the riser. The 
elimination of the suspension- line- to- ri ser  
connection and the use of multiple strands 
of braided cord instead of the webbing riser 
used in the Block 11 construction allowed a 
weight saving of approximately 1 .5  pounds. 
The 16.5-foot-diameter drogue para- 
chutes were reefed at 42.8 percent of their 
nominal diameter for  10 seconds. The 
10-second reefing cutter used in the drogue 
parachutes was identical to the reefing cut- 
ter used in the main-parachute second-stage 
reefing system. 
Figure A- 16. - Final Block 11 drogue 
parachute. 
TABLE A-I. - COMPARATIVE CHARACTERISTICS O F  ORIGINAL AND FINAL 
BLOCK 11 DROGUE PARACHUTES 
Drogue-parachute characterist ics 
Nominal diameter,  ft . . . . . . . . .  
Gores,  number . . . . . . . . . . .  
Drag area, sq ft . . . . . . . . . . .  
Total porosity, percent . . . . . . .  
-* 
Gore construction . . . . . . . . . . .  
Rise r  ma te r i a l .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Suspension-line material . . . . . . .  
Rated strength, lb . . . . . . . . .  
Maximum design-limit load, lb . . . .  
Parachute-assembly weight, lb . . . .  
Block I1 
13.7 
16 
68 
23 
Spliced horizontals 
Dacron webbing 
Nylon cord 
1500 
12 600 
25.4 
Increased Capability Block I1 
16. 5 
20 
114 
22.4 
Continuous horizontals 
Continuation of suspension lines 
Nylon cord 
2 500 
17 200 
37.4 
A-11 
Because of an increase in the drogue-parachute design loads from 1 2  600 to 
17 200 pounds, the steel-cable portion of the drogue r i se r  had to be strengthened. This 
strengthening was accomplished by replacing the three strands of 0.28-inch cable by 
four strands of 0.25-inch cable, and by incorporating the necessary changes to the r i s e r  
and fittings (fig. A-17). TO reduce the abrasive action between the steel-cable riser 
and the spacecraft flowerpot fitting, a lead- 
tape wrapping-was added to drogue cable 
risers where they contact the flowerpot 
fitting. 
Drogue Mortar-Assembly 
Modif icat ions 
The drogue mortar function for the 
Increased Capability Block I1 system was 
identical to that of the Blocks I and 11 con- 
figurations. The major difference was that 
the new mortar assembly was designed to 
deploy a larger and a heavier drogue para- 
180 i n  
diameter 
steel cables chute (fig. A-18). 
T 
To acquire additional volume for the 
larger parachute, the drogue mortar was 
increased in diameter from 11.4 to 
12.6 inches, and the face of the mortar was 
cQntoured to the inner radius of the forward 
heat shield. The increase in ejected weight 
presented a problem in attaining the neces- 
sary muzzle velocity with the new mortar 
-~ 
Increased capability 
Block Ll 
Block II 
Figure A- 17. - Drogue-parachute riser 
assembly. 
Cartridge 
Mortar 7 Breech7 
Drogue-parach ute tube - 
Riser assembly, 
metal 
without exceeding the maximum allowable 
reaction load. This task was accomplished 
by using an optimized erodible orifice to 
regulate the flow of gas from the breech 
assembly into the mortar tube. 
The design, performance, and struc- 
tural  integrity of the new drogue mortar 
were demonstrated satisfactorily and were 
qualified on the basis of successful per- 
formance during the system-qualification 
aerial drop tes ts  and in laboratory mission- 
environmental qualification tests.  The 
mortar configuration remained unchanged 
throughout qualification testing. 
P i I ot-P a rac h u t e  System 
Figure A-18. - Increased Capability 
Block II drogue-parachute mortar 
assembly. 
The pilot-parachute mortar remained 
unchanged from the earlier Block II design. 
The significant changes to the assembly 
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were modifications to strengthen the pilot 
parachute. The parachute (fig. A-19) w a s  
modified to increase the strength specifica- 
tion of the suspension lines from 400 to 
600 pounds, and was changed from a 
multiple-ply-webbing riser to the integrated 
suspension-line and riser configuration 
similar to that used on the drogue para- 
chute. The multiple-ply-webbing riser de- 
sign was unsatisfactory because of 
susceptibility to improper manufacturing. 
In securing the plies of webbing, uneven 
gathering of a single ply of webbing often 
occurred. This condition was difficult to 
detect by visual inspection and resulted i n  
uneven load distribution between the plies 
of webbing. Because of this condition, 
the r i s e r  assembly failed to satisfy the 
strength requirements. The design 
changes incorporated into the pilot- 
parachute suspension lines and riser re- 
solved this deficiency. 
5 
- 
-Deployment bag, 
pilot parachute 
.33 Ib 
Steel riser 
1 ".I in: ,I> 
1.47 Ib 111 in. 
I I T  
Parachute type ringslot 
Nominal diameter: 7.2 i t  
No. of gores: 12 
Constructed porosity 22 percent 
Drag area: 24.4 ft2 
Figure A- 19. - Final Block 11 pilot 
parachute. 
BI ock I I Forwa rd-Heat- S h ield- Separation -Augmentation System 
The incorporation of a forward-heat-shield-separation-augmentation parachute 
system in  the Block 11 heat shield was somewhat more complex than the same modifica- 
tion to the Block I system. The conical shape of the Block I forward heat shield allowed 
for installation of the parachute mortar assembly directly under the apex of the cover. 
With the Block II docking provisions, the forward heat shield assumed the shape of a 
frustum that required the separation-augmentation mortar assembly to be installed on 
the inner wall of the heat shield. This installation was further complicated by the re- 
quirement to delay the mortar firing until 
the forward heat shield had sufficiently sep- 
arated from the CM to allow the parachute 
pack assembly to be ejected through the 
docking tunnel opening in the heat shield 
without impacting the top of the docking tun- 
ne1 (fig. A-20). This requirement was met 
by incorporating a time-delay firing circuit, 
activated by lanyards attached to the for- 
ward heat shield. The firing current w a s  
transmitted from the CM to the forward- 
heat- shield mortar pyrotechnic initiators 
through an  umbilical which was deployed 
from the heat shield as it separated from 
the CM. Because the mortar was  mounted 
on the inner wall of the heat shield, the in- 
stallation of a ramp above the mortar was 
necessary to deflect the parachute pack so 
that it would pass through the docking tun- 
ne1 opening in the heat shield. 
Mortar 
car 
Figure A-20. - Block 11 forward-heat- 
shield mortar installation. 
A-1 3 
The parachute used was  a convention- 
al Apollo 7.2-foot-diameter ringslot para- 
chute identical to that used to extract the 
main parachutes. To reduce the loads, 
the parachute incorporated fixed o r  perma- 
nent reefing to reduce its effective drag 
area. Because of volume limitation in the 
CM forward compartment, the convention- 
al cylindrically- shaped pilot mortar could 
not be used. By relocating certain equip- 
ment in the forward compartment, it was 
possible to install the elliptically shaped 
forward-heat- shield mortar assembly 
illustrated in figure A-21. The Block II 
forward- heat- shield- separation- 
augmentation system was successfully dem- 
onstrated during the Increased Capability 
Block I1 test program. 
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Cover 7 Ring, foamed riser- 
L Orifice 
Pressure cartridge (two each, not shown) 
Breech 
Figure A-21. - Block I1 forward-heat- 
shield mortar assembly. 
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APPENDIX B 
SUMMARY OF TESTS 
Each component of the Block I, Block 11, and Increased Capability Block 11 ELS 
was subjected to extensive testing during the developmental and qualification phases of 
the programs. Considerably more developmental testing was associated with the 
Block I effort because this program established the basic designs from which the 
Block 11 and the Increased Capability Block 11 system evolved. However, the same 
general approach and testing techniques were applied during each of the three programs. 
A s  the programs progressed, when defining the test requirements associated 
with the modifications made to the system, much consideration was given to test  data 
generated during the preceding ELS programs. During each of the programs, before 
qualification testing, each component had to demonstrate a sufficiently high degree of 
performance and reliability during developmental o r  prequalification testing. 
In defining the tests for the ELS, two basic requirements had to be satisfied. 
One requirement was  to demonstrate that each component and subassembly of the total 
system was capable of withstanding the total-mission environment and functioning prop- 
erly with adequate margins and within specified tolerances. The second requirement 
was to demonstrate that the total system would function properly in all potential flight 
modes and that a safe interface existed between the various components of the CM and 
the parachute recovery system. 
The nature of the ELS made it impractical to combine these two requirements 
into a single test  program where the parts could be subjected to mission environments 
in a laboratory and then to operating conditions in an aerial drop test. Considering 
also such factors as the amount of time and handling required between the laboratory 
and the test, this approach would not have been valid, nor would the results have been 
representative of conditions encountered in an actual mission. Therefore, two separate 
and somewhat independent test programs had to be conducted, that is, the aerial  drop 
tests and the laboratory tests. 
LABORATORY TEST PROGRAM 
The laboratory testing conducted during the program was generally confined to 
individual component and lower assembly-level tests. Each component was evaluated 
in t e rms  of potential loss of strength or performance (or both) resulting from exposure 
to the environments of the Apollo mission and the interface between that component and 
the spacecraft. In the laboratory, much effort was expended in testing various compo- 
nents to support the selection of the most promising designs, to support the failure 
analyses, and to obtain performance data on new designs. Af t e r  each component had 
demonstrated the required level of performance, it was subjected to qualification testing. 
Each qualification test article w a s  manufactured, inspected, and accepted as i f  it were 
spacecraft hardware. During the qualification tests, if any item failed to meet the 
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prescribed levels of performance, the failure was formally reported, and a thorough 
analysis was performed to determine the exact cause and the necessary corrective 
action. 
The laboratory qualification tests performed on the various components of the 
Block I ELS are summarized in table B-I. Laboratory testing on the original Block I1 
system was centered mainly around the changes made between Blocks I and 11. This 
testing included the redesigned main-parachute deployment bag, the main-parachute 
steel-cable riser, and the redesigned pilot-parachute mortar. 
TABLE B-I. - SUMMARY OF BLOCK I LABORATORY TESTING 
Component 
Textile materials 
Suspension-line connector links 
Pilot steel-cable r i se r  
Drogue steel-cable riser 
Main-parachute harness 
Vehicle harness-attachment fitting 
Main- parac hute r i se r  
Main-parachute retention assembly 
Reefing-line cutters 
Pilot- mortar assembly 
Drogue-mortar assembly 
Main-parachute disconnect assembly 
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Test conditions 
Temperature and vacuum 
Structural 
Structural and abrasion 
Structural and abrasion 
Structural and abrasion 
Structural 
Structural and abrasion 
Humidity, acceleration, vibration, thermal 
vacuum , high tempera tu r e 
Humidity, acceleration, thermal vacuum, drop, 
high temperature, low temperature, physical 
strength 
Humidity, vibration, thermal vacuum, high 
temperature, low temperature 
Humidity, vibration, thermal vacuum, high 
temperature, low temperature 
Humidity, vibration, thermal vacuum, high 
temperature, low temperature, immersion 
During the original Block II program, emphasis w a s  placed on ground testing to 
thoroughly evaluate the changes made from the Block I design. These ground tes ts  
were used extensively to obtain comparative performance data on several main- 
parachute-deployment-bag configurations being considered. The ground-test approach 
considerably reduced the number of required aerial drop tests and reduced the program 
cost. 
Following the decision to modify the Block I1 ELS to increase its capability to re- 
cover the heavier CM, the establishment of ground-test requirements was necessary. 
Because each component of the ELS had been qualified previously for use on manned 
spacecraft, the extent to which retest was necessary was  governed strictly by the na- 
ture and the extent of individual component redesign. For  example, modifications 
were made to the reefing cutters to vary the delay time from 8 to 6 and 1 0  seconds. 
This change affected only the pyrotechnic time-delay element in the cutter, not the 
structure o r  actuating mechanism. Therefore, the redesign reefing cutters were sub- 
jected only to the mission-environmental test conditions that could influence the per- 
formance of the time-delay element, that is, acceleration, high and low temperature, 
and high humidity. 
Those components requiring major redesign, such as the drogue-parachute 
mortar assembly, were subjected to extensive laboratory tests. In such cases, the 
verification of the structural adequacy, performance characteristics, and overall re- 
liability of the redesigned components over a wide range of mission conditions was 
necessary. Much of this laboratory work had to be accomplished before integration of 
the particular components into the aerial drop tests. 
AERIAL DROP TESTS 
The aerial drop tests were conducted at the A i r  Forcernavy Joint Parachute Test 
Facility, El Centro, California. This facility was ideally equipped for Apollo-type drop 
testing because it provided a fully instrumental test range, an onsite shop, and adminis- 
trative office space. Sources for data acquisition included ground- to-air and air-to-air 
photographic coverage, ground cine- theodolite tracking stations, and a telemetry 
ground station. In addition, the El Centro test facility provided many of the drop air- 
craft and the test-vehicle ground-handling equipment. All BP vehicle drop tests were 
made from a modified C-133A aircraft  provided by NASA and manned by contractor 
personnel. 
Three basic types of vehicles used in the aerial drop tests included an instru- 
mented cylindrical test vehicle (ICTV), a parachute test vehicle (PTV), and the boiler- 
plate (BP) test vehicles. Often referred to as a bomb-drop vehicle, the ICTV w a s  
simple in concept, rugged in construction, and low in cost (fig. B-1). The ICTV was 
used on tests where the CM interface was not a consideration and where it provided 
simplicity; minimizing test-preparation time. These vehicles were usually equipped 
for telemetry and m5aard photographic dzita acquisition. 
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Figure B-1. - Instrumented cylindrical test vehicle. 
Well suited for testing at the total-system level, the PTV was  designed to simu- 
late the major features of the spacecraft upper deck (fig. B-2). Below the deck level, 
the PTV was a simple cone shape of sturdy construction to eliminate impact damage. 
Because the total drag area of the PTV was much less than that of a CM, this vehicle 
was well suited for conducting system-level tests at dynamic pressure conditions above 
the limits for spacecraft. 
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Figure B-2. - Parachute test vehicle. 
The BP test vehicle was the most elaborate spacecraft- representative test vehicle 
used in the parachute drop tests (fig. B-3). The test accurately simulated the CM 
weight, the center of gravity, and the geometric profile. In addition to testing the total 
parachute recovery system, the test could incorporate the forward-heat-shield jettison. 
Al l  the various components interfacing with the ELS (location aids, vehicle-uprighting 
bags, and other spacecraft components) that could affect, or be affected by, the para- 
chutes were installed on the BP. The BP was the first  vehicle in which the spacecraft- 
configuration ELS sequence controller performed the system-sequencing functions. 
Instrumentation in the BP was  similar to that used on the PTV, consisting primarily of 
telemetry and onboard cameras. 
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Figure B- 3. - Boilerplate test vehicle. 
BLOCK I DEVELOPMENTAL DROP TESTS 
During the Blocks I and 11 programs, the aerial drop tests were classified as being 
either developmental tests o r  qualification tests. Developmental tests were further 
grouped into individual test series according to specific test objectives. 
I 
The aeria1,drop tests made during the Block I developmental program a r e  illus- 
trated in figure B-4. During the first year of the Block I developmental effort, many 
single- main-parachute ICTV drop tests were made to evaluate various main-parachute 
design concepts. In 1963, much of the developmental testing consisted of multiple 
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Figure B-4. - Block I developmental drop-test summary. 
parachute (cluster) tes ts  and the higher-level system tests. During these tests, the 
main-parachute-cluster interference problems became a concern. Several two-main- 
parachute ICTV drop tests were conducted during the first 6 months of 1964 to evaluate 
the main-parachute modifications incorporated to improve cluster inflation. Following 
a limited ser ies  of total-system verification tests, the Block I developmental drop test 
was concluded early in 1965 with drop tests to demonstrate the ultimate strength capa- 
bility of the drogue- and main-parachute designs. 
A s  the time approachdd for  the qualification aerial  drop tests to begin to support 
the spacecraft flights, certain qualifiable configuration components apparently were 
not going to be available fo r  the initial tests. Problems encountered during the latter 
part  of the developmental program required that some late changes be made to certain 
components; time was insufficient to incorporate all these changes in the initial system- 
qualification drop tests. Although a basic rule for qualification testing states that items 
subject to qualification be of the spacecraft configuration, compelling schedules neces- 
sitated initiation of total-system testing with certain items that were not yet in a quali- 
fiable configuration. These i tems included the drogue and pilot mortar cartridges, 
the main-parachute disconnect and cartridge, and the reefing-line cutters. The use of 
these interim components was permitted on the basis of similarity to final design and 
on the fact that the flight items were to be subjected to laboratory qualification tests. 
The plan w a s  to phase the final-design components into the qualification drop-test 
program at the earliest date. 
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BLOCK I SYSTEM-QUAL1 FICATION DROP TEST 
From May 6, 1965, to February 24, 1966, 12 aerial drop tests were made to 
complete qualification of the Block I ELS and to rate the system suitable for manned 
flights. A summary of this program is presented in table B-11. 
TABLE E-II. - SUMMARY OF BLOCK I QUALIFICATION DROP TESTS 
60-1 1 5-6-65 1 Normal entr)  
62-1 1 6-3-65 /“E 
a1 ti  tude 
b62-3 8-5-65 Pad abor t  
62-2 I 8-19-65 IMediuni- 
alt i tude 
abor t  
62-3A I 9-23-65 I P a d a b o r t  
‘62-4 [ 10-8-65 INormal entry 
alt i tude 
abor t  
alt i tude 
62-9 1 2-24-66 lkiigh- 
alt i tude 
a b o r t  (one 
drogue) 
aDynamic pressure .  bTes t  62-3 p r o g r a m e r  parachute failed to disconnect.  ‘Test 62-4 failed to meet  requifed t e s t  conditions 
The drop-test conditions were established to demonstrate the system under as 
many operational flight conditions as possible. The following test  conditions were 
selected for the qualification drop tests. 
1. Normal-entry simulations - three tests 
2. High-altitude-abort simulation - two tests 
3. Medium-altitude-abort simulations - two tests 
4. Pad-abort simulations - two tes ts  
5. High-altitude-abort simulation with one drogue parachute - one test  
Although 10 tests were planned in this series, 1 2  tes ts  were actually conducted because 
of failure on two occasions to achieve the desired test conditions. 
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In these tests, the service ceiling of the C-133 drop-test aircraft (30 000-feet 
maximum altitude) and other limitations would not allow complete duplication of the 
operational flight modes. For  example, in  an operational normal entry o r  high-altitude 
abort, the drogue parachutes would normally be deployed by closure of the high-altitude 
baroswitches at approximately 24 000 feet. In a drop-test simulation of these opera- 
tional modes, the BP test vehicle was  released at 30 000 feet. To allow for a minimum 
auxiliary-brake parachute- stabilization interval and some- finite free-fall interval to 
achieve the required dynamic pressure condition, drogue-parachute deployment (initi- 
ated by an auxiliary events controller) had to be delayed to altitudes moderately below 
the normal 24 000-foot level. A s  a result, two compromises were made in the total 
performance of the ELS, that is, recovery was not initiated by the sequence-controller 
barometric switches, and the normal drogue-parachute operating interval was reduced 
from a normal 50 to 55 seconds to approximately 25 seconds. The first compromise 
was  reconciled by monitoring the sequence controllers for proper closure of the baro- 
metric switches, thus acquiring evidence of satisfactory performance. Analysis 
showed that the lack of the full drogue interval would not have a significant effect on 
the test conditions at the time of main-parachute deployment because there would be 
no substantial improvement in vehicle dynamic stability after the 25-second test inter- 
val. Secondly, the shorter drogue interval represented a more demanding condition 
pertaining to total-system operation than that which would be experienced in a compara- 
ble spacecraft operation. 
Although desired dynamic pressure and vehicle attitude could be programed into 
the tests, a representative flight-path angle could not be achieved. Also, the marginal 
stability of the BP vehicles made the acquisition of desired initial attitudes and CM 
dynamics at the end of long free-fall intervals very difficult. At the end of the free- 
fall interval, these test limitations generally resulted in vehicle dynamics more severe 
than those predicted for an actual mission. Because the test conditions were more 
severe than those the spacecraft would experience, the tests were judged as a satisfac- 
tory demonstration of the systems capabilities. 
With the exception of a minor modification in the main-parachute retention sys- 
tem incorporated in the last four tests, the remaining six qualification drop tests were 
conducted with the final Block I ELS configuration. 
BLOCK I I DEVELOPMENTAL DROP TESTS 
The major changes from the Block I to the Block 11 ELS concerned the redesigned 
main-parachute deployment bag and retention system, the steel-cable main-parachute 
riser, the flowerpot parachute-attachment fitting, and the modified pilot-parachute 
mortar. The Block 11 developmental drop-test program was oriented to demonstrate 
that these modifications did not degrade the strength o r  the performance of the system 
in any way. 
The developmental drop-test program was originally planned as a ser ies  of three, 
single, main-parachute PTV tests. However, during the second test of the series,  a 
strength deficiency was found in the main-parachute canopy, and three interim tests 
were conducted to demonstrate the adequacy of the f i x  to the main parachute before 
conducting the final test of the developmental test series.  
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BLOCK I I QUAL1 FICATION DROP TESTS 
Test  
number 
13-4  
73-1 
73-3 
73-5 
From October 19, 1966, to January 17, 1967, a series of four total-system 
aerial drop tests was conducted using the BP-6 vehicle, modified to the Block 11 con- 
figuration. This ser ies  of tests (table B-111) completed qualification on what was then 
believed to be the final ELS. Before entering this test series,  a basic ground rule was 
established stating that only qualified o r  qualifiable parachute system components and 
installation specifications would be used in the test series. This policy was maintained 
throughout the test series;  in contrast to the Block I test series,  no configuration 
changes were made to the hardware during the Block 11 qualification drop-test program. 
~~ 
Pilot  mortar f i re  Parachute disconnect Drogue mortar f i re  
Recovery Forward- 
Simulation weight, ~~~~~d Altitude, qa, Time,  Altitude, qa, Time,  Altitude, qa, Time,  Iste 
Ib jettison It x IO3 lb/ft2 It x IO3 lb/ft2 It x l o 3  lb/ft2 
10-19-66 High-altitude 11  000 No 2 6 . 8  3 7 . 6  2 4 . 7  22. 5 1 1 4 . 8  3 6 . 4  10.8 50. 1 75 .  6 
abort 
12-1-66 Pad abort with 11 785 Yes 8 . 9  4 6 . 4  73 .08  8. 5 58.8  7 4 . 8  7 . 9  6 8 . 4  7 6 . 8  
short drogue 
interval __ 
12-20-66 Medium-altitude 1 1  785 Yes 1 9 . 2  4 6 . 7  4 9 . 7  1 8 . 7  5 3 . 2 5 1 . 5  4 . 4  4 9 . 7  1 0 1 . 8  
abort with 
extended 
drogue 
interval 
1-17-67 Normal entry 11  785 Yes 2 5 . 0  70.1 29. 5 2 4 . 4  7 6 . 7  3 1 . 3  1 0 . 6  51. 6 8 0 . 4  
TABLE E-111. - SUMMARY OF BLOCK I1 QUALIFICATION DROP TESTS 
'Dynamic pressure.  
A second basic difference between the Blocks I and I1 test programs was an 
attempt in Block 11 to eliminate the off-limit and overtest conditions prevalent in the 
Block I series. Two of the Block I tests had to be repeated, and other tes ts  were 
difficult to rationalize as fully valid because of their severity. In the Block I effort, 
long free-fall periods, used to obtain high dynamic pressures,  often resulted in a very 
unstable vehicle and higher- than-desired dynamic pressures.  In the Block 11 effort, 
smaller programer parachutes were used; they remained attached to the vehicle and 
remained operative until attaining the desired test conditions and attaining the initiation 
of the recovery sequence. This technique permitted control over the attitude of the 
vehicle and over body rates  to the point where the ELS functions began. This technique 
resulted in near-nominal and sometimes below-nominal conditions for certain flight 
modes; however, the tes ts  were far more representative of spacecraft conditions than 
were many of the Block I tests. 
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The Block II qualification drop tests were also characterized by two added opera- 
tional simulations not demonstrated in  Block I. The first simulation involved an early 
manual main-parachute deployment whereby the crew elects to override the automatic 
sequence. This operation results in  a short drogue-parachute interval. The second 
simulation concerned the main-parachute inhibit mode whereby the crew elects to delay 
automatic main-parachute deployment and to extend the drogue interval. This tech- 
nique could be used to avoid drifting back to a land landing in the event of a near-pad 
abort. 
1967 
One aspect of the Block II qualification drop tests, which might be considered as 
being off -limit, concerned test-vehicle recovery weight. Although the specifications 
still reflected a maximum vehicle weight of 11 000 pounds at the time of the tests, the 
projected weight for Block II spacecraft had risen to 11 785 pounds. The three final 
tests were conducted with the vehicle at this increased weight. 
1968 
The results obtained from the Block I1 qualification drop tests demonstrated the 
capability of the Block I1 ELS to land the CM safely under the conditions stipulated in 
the specifications. 
INCREASED CAPAB IL lTY  BLOCK I I DEVELOPMENTAL DROP TESTS 
The aer ia l  drop tes ts  conducted in support of the Increased Capability Block 11 
program began on July 10, 1967, and continued until July 17, 1968, when the final 
parachute drop test was completed at El Centro, California. The developmental and 
design-verification tests were established as five series, identified as 80, 81, 82, 83, 
and 84 (fig. B-5). The individual tests in each ser ies  were identified by dash numbers 
(80-1, 80-2, et cetera). A 99 ser ies  was  later added to augment the drogue-parachute 
test. 
__ 
Series 
~ 
80 
81 
a2 
a3 
84 
w 
- 
Reefing evaluation, single 
parachute 
Reefing evaluation, iwo- 
parachute cluster 
Main-parachute strength 
verification 
Main-parachute cluster 
test, missed second- 
stage reefing (one of 
three parachutes) 
Total-system test, two 
drogues, two and three 
main parachutes 
Drogue-parachute strength 
verification, two-para- 
chute cluster 
T T T T T T  T 
T T T T  
Y T  
T ICN 
v PN 
Y T  
V v T T  T T 
I 
v v  
Figure B- 5. - Increased Capability Block II developmental drop-test summary. 
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The 80 and 81 ser ies  were quite similar in that both were aimed at developing 
the two-stage main-parachute reefing system. The 80 ser ies  was single main- 
parachute tests; on the other hand, the 81 ser ies  used clusters of two main parachutes. 
In the 80 series, Seven single parachute tests were conducted with the primary objec- 
tives being to confirm the effective canopy drag areas and load estimates, to determine 
f i l l  rates, to establish the time interval for the reefed stages, and to determine the 
second-stage reefing-line load. Four 81 series cluster tests were conducted to evalu- 
ate staged reefing with a cluster of two parachutes, representing the design condition, 
to establish reefed load sharing, to determine quantitatively the effect of nonsynchro- 
nous deployment and disreef, and to obtain further verification of selected reefing 
parameters. 
I 
I 
I 
Using single main parachutes and the ICTV, the 82 ser ies  were verification tests 
of canopy strength. This ser ies  consisted of four tests conducted to demonstrate the 
ultimate load-carrying capability of the main parachute in the first-stage reefed con- 
dition, the second-stage reefed condition, and the full-open condition. 
I 
The 83 and 84 ser ies  were similar because both were combined drogue and clus- 
tered main-parachute tests using the PTV. The 83 ser ies  was planned primarily as 
developmental type tests to establish drogue reefing parameters and t o  obtain additional 
performance data on main-parachute clusters. The planned 84 series was  to have been 
conducted with final spacecraft-configuration hardware and w a s  to have included drogue- 
parachute ultimate-strength verification tests. Because of delays in the test schedule, 
the unavailability of spacecraft-configuration hardware, and'the close similarity 
between the objectives of the 83 and 84 ser ies ,  only one of the 83-series tests was 
actually conducted to demonstrate the effect of a missed second-stage reefing in one of 
a cluster of three main parachutes. The test results supported an analysis showing 
that the total axial load generated by a single main parachute (in a three-parachute 
cluster) would not exceed the structural capability of the parachute if i t  prematurely 
disreefed from, o r  bypassed, the second-stage reefing. 
The 83 and 84 ser ies  were followed by the 99 ser ies  of supplementary drogue- 
parachute-strength verification tests, which included one test to demonstrate drogue- 
parachute deployment at an altitude of 40 000 feet. This test simulated a condition 
wherein the astronauts would initiate an early drogue-parachute deployment to stabilize 
the CM. 
INCREASED CAPABILITY BLOCK I I QUALIFICATION TESTS 
On April 4, 1968, the first of a ser ies  of seven qualification aerial drop tes ts  
was conducted on the final configuration of the ELS. This series was completed on 
July 3, 1968, approximately 1 year after formal approval of the ELS increased capa- 
bility program and 3 months before the first flight of the system on a manned Apollo 
spacecraft. 
During the qualification tests, each tested component was identical to the space- 
craft production design with one minor exception. During the three final tests, strain- 
gage link assemblies were incorporated in the main-parachute r i se r  to obtain parachute 
load data under simulated operational conditions of the spacecraft. 
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The Increased Capability Block 11 qualification program consisted of the following 
tests (table B-IV). 
85-6 
85-5 
1. Two pad-abort simulations were conducted; one test demonstrated the by- 
2. The second test conditions pertained to high-altitude-abort simulations with- 
passed drogue condition. One test included jettison of the forward heat shield. 
out the forward heat shield. Both tes ts  used only one drogue parachute, and one test 
used only two main parachutes. 
5-14-68 Pad abort 1 3 0 0 0  No _ _  _ -  _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  10.2 92 .3  3 . 0  
(drogue 
bypass) 
6-6-68 Highaltitude 13 000 Yes 29.0 42.7 15.0 19 .6  170. 5 36. 5 4.2 63 .5  84 .8  
abort (one 
3. The third test conditions concerned three normal- entry simulations, all 
incorporating jettison of the forward heat shield. Two of these tests demonstrated 
single-drogue parachute conditions; one of these tests demonstrated the system with 
a 1 3  500-pound vehicle recovery weight. The apex-forward attitude of the vehicle, 
required to achieve the desired test conditions, prevented the use of the forward-heat- 
shield system during three of the tests. 
drogue) 
The drop tests made during the qualification series were dispersed as widely as 
possible over the potential operational envelopes for the drogue and main parachutes 
(figs. B-6(a) and B-6(b)). Included in figure B-6 a r e  the test conditions at which the 
drogue and main parachutes have been demonstrated during the total system-level (BP 
vehicle) tests. Limitations imposed by the drop aircraft prevented drogue-parachute 
deployments at the higher altitudes; however, the high-dynamic-pressure conditions 
were well demonstrated. For each of the qualification tests, the conditions obtained 
were very close to desired values, and no discrepancies of sufficient magnitude were 
encountered to invalidate the test o r  to prevent fulfilling the test  objectives. 
1 85-4 1 6- l i -68  
On the basis of the performance of the parachute system during each of the 
qualification drop tests, and on successful completion of laboratory qualification at 
the component and lower-assembly level, the Increased Capability Block II ELS was  
verified for use on manned Apollo spacecraft. 
25, f i  I 19.6 29.1 24.9 92 .5  30.9 4 . 3  65 .1  96. 5 
I I I I I I Norniaientry (one drome)  
TABLE B-IV. - SUMMARY OF INCREASED CAPABILITY BLOCK I1 QUALIFICATION DROP TESTS 
85-7 7-3-68 Highaltitude 1 3  OOO No 28.9 42. 0 20.1 22. 5 149. 5 35.4 4.4 63.3 91 .6  
abort (one 
drogue and 
two mains) 
aDwarnie pressure .  
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40000 
r 30000- 
u 
c .- 
20000- 
10000 - 
' 0  o BP test points 
/ Normal entry m , ' " and hiah- 
High-altitude abort 
~ 
,1 .2 . 3  .4  .5 .6 .7 
Mach number 
.2 . 3  .4  
4 
0 .1 
Mach number 
(a) Drogue parachute. (b) Main parachute. 
Figure B-6. - Deployment envelope. 
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M A I N  PARACHUTE FAILURE 
The th ree  main parachutes of t h e  Apollo 15 spacecraf t  deployed and 
i n f l a t e d  properly at approximately 10 000 feet, a l t i t u d e .  Films show t h a t  
all th ree  parachutes d is reefed  and opened fully i n  t h e  proper sequence. 
The spacecraf t  and i t s  parachutes were obscured by clouds at about 7000 
f e e t  a l t i t u d e .  
one of t h e  t h r e e  main parachutes was def la ted  as shown i n  f igu re  1. The 
spacecraf t  and parachute system descended i n  t h i s  configuration t o  water 
landing. The t h r e e  parachutes were disconnected and one of t h e  good main 
parachutes was, recovered. The failure occurred abrupt ly .  A t  about t he  
a l t i t u d e  and t i m e  of t h e  f a i l u r e ,  t h e  forward heat  s h i e l d  w a s  i n  c lose  
proximity t o  t h e  spacecraf t  and t h e  react ion cont ro l  system propel lan t  
deplet ion f i r i n g  w a s  about completed. An inspect ion of t h e  recovered 
parachute showed one of  t h e  s i x  r iser links had a broken s tud and th ree  
others  had cracks. The inves t iga t ion  of t h e  f a i l u r e  w a s ,  t he re fo re ,  fo- 
cused on t h e  reac t ion  cont ro l  system propel lant  deplet ion f i r i n g ,  t h e  
forward hea t  s h i e l d ,  and t h e  f a i l e d  l i n k s .  
Upon emerging from t h e  clouds at about 6000 f e e t  a l t i t u d e ,  
DESCRIPTION AND SYSTEM OPERATION 
The ea r th  landing system decelerates and s t a b i l i z e s  the  command mod- 
ule t o  safe conditions f o r  landing. The l a n d i n p  sequence i s  i n i t i a t e d  a t  
a nominal a l t i t u d e  of 24 000 f e e t  with j e t t i s o n i n g  of t he  forward heat  
sh i e ld .  Immediately a f t e r  separat ion of t h e  heat sh i e ld  from t h e  command 
module, a 7.2-foot-diameter parachute i s  mortar-deployed from the  forward 
heat sh i e ld .  This parachute prevents i n i t i a l  recontact between the  heat  
sh i e ld  and t h e  command module. 
Two 16.5-foot diameter conical ribbon-type drogue parachutes a re  mor- 
tar-deployed 1.6 seconds a f t e r  forward heat s h i e l d  j e t t i s o n .  The drogue 
parachutes are deployed i n  a reefed condition and, 10 seconds l a t e r ,  in-  
f l a t e  t o  t h e  f’ully open configuration. The drogue parachutes a r e  re leased  
from the  command module a t  an a l t i t u d e  of about 11 000 f e e t .  A t  drogue 
parachute disconnect,  t h ree  7.2-foot diameter r i n r - s l o t  p i l o t  parachutes 
a re  mortar-deployed. The p i l o t  parachutes provide the  force necessary t o  
r e l ease  t h e  main parachute re ten t ion  system and p u l l  t he  main parachute 
pack assemblies from t h e  upper deck. A s  t h e  mair, parachute packs a re  
pul led away from the  command module, the parachute.. a re  ex t rac ted  from 
t h e i r  deployment bags. Each main parachute i n f l a t e s  through two reef ing  
s tages  t o  the  f’ully open configuration. The th ree  main parachute assem- 
blies ( f i g .  2 )  dece lera te  t h e  command module t o  the  f i n a l  descent ve loc i ty .  
Each main parachute canopy consis ts  of twelve r ings of sa i ls  with 
each r i n g  divided i n t o  68 gores,  The canopy terminates i n  68 suspension 
c-3 
h 
Figtire 1 . -  Spacecraft descetiding with one main parachute failed 
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7 Fabric r iser 
Steel cable r iser 
Main parachute 
cznopy 
l ink 
ser 
Fabric r iser 
Figure 2.- Parachute system configuration. 
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l i n e s  which are a t tached  by s i x  s t e e l  connector l i n k s  t o  s i x  ind iv idua l  
legs  of a f a b r i c  r i s e r .  The s i x  l egs  of t h e  f a b r i c  r i s e r  coverge i n t o  
a s i n g l e  l e g  which connects t o  t h e  end of a s t e e l  cable  r i s e r .  The t h r e e  
s t e e l  cable r i s e r s  of t h e  parachute  system coverge and a t t a c h  t o  t h e  com- 
mand module through t h e  parachute  attachment and disconnect assembly. 
DISCUSS1 ON 
A discussion of t h e  a n a l y s i s ,  t e s t s ,  conclusions,  and co r rec t ive  
ac t ions  a re  contained i n  t h i s  r epor t .  A l l  t imes shown i n  t h i s  repor t  
a r e  elapsed time from range zero.  Range zero i s  t h e  nea res t  i n t e g r a l  
second p r i o r  t o  l i f t - o f f .  
FLIGHT DATA 
Per t inent  da t a  and t h e  sequence of events  a r e  shown i n  f i g u r e  3. 
The da ta  showed no abnormal condi t ions o r  events p r i o r  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e .  
About 3.5 seconds before  t h e  f a i l u r e ,  t h e  r eac t ion  con t ro l  system man- 
i f o l d  pressure abrupt ly  increased  t o  a new l e v e l ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  regula- 
t o r  had closed because a l l  t h e  ox id ize r  w a s  expel led from t h e  t anks .  The 
f u e l ,  however, w a s  s t i l l  be ing  expel led  and was ca l cu la t ed  t o  have been 
depleted about 4.7 seconds a f t e r  t h e  ox id ize r  deple t ion .  
on a determination of about 7 pounds of f u e l  remaining at oz id i ze r  deple- 
t i o n .  
purge was i n i t i a t e d  by t h e  crew. 
u n t i l  some time a f t e r  t h e  purge.)  
f i gu re  3 by t h e  abrupt decrease i n  system p res su re .  
T h i s  w a s  based 
About 8 seconds after t h e  f a i l u r e ,  t h e  r eac t ion  con t ro l  system 
(The crew w a s  unaware of t h e  f a i l u r e  
The time of t h e  purge i s  ind ica t ed  i n  
The forces  ac t ing  upon t h e  spacecraf t  at t h e  time t h e  parachute  
f a i l e d  were determined from body-mounted accelerometer data. The force  
vec tor  change a t  t h e  parachute a t t a c h  po in t  w a s :  
This r e s u l t a n t  vec tor  l oca t e s  t h e  f a i l e d  parachute  as shown i n  f i g -  
The computed fo rce  vec tor  w a s  s u b s t a n t i a t e d  by body-mounted r a t e  ure 4 .  
gyro data.  
PHOTOGRAPHIC DATA 
Figure 5 shows the  spacecraf t  and lower parachute  system when the  
spacecraf t  was r e l a t i v e l y  c lose  t o  landing.  The following observat ions 
r e su l t ed  from study of t h i s  f i g u r e  and o t h e r  photographic data.  
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Figure 4.- Parachute location at  t ime of failure 
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A 
a. Apparently t h r e e  of t h e  s i x  legs of t h e  f a b r i c  riser were t ak ing  
t h e  load.  
b .  
c.  
There was  no s i g n i f i c a n t  canopy damage observed. 
About two-thirds of the  suspension l i n e s  appeared t o  be missing. 
CREW OBSERVATIONS 
The Command Module P i l o t ,  while looking through t h e  lef t -hand rendez- 
vous window, witnessed t h e  j e t t i s o n i n g  o f  t h e  hea t  s h i e l d  and the deploy- 
ment of t h e  drogue parachutes;  both funct ions appeared nominal. A f e w  
seconds a f t e r  drogue parachute  r e l e a s e ,  t h e  Command Module P i l o t  observed 
the deployment of the main parachutes i n  the  r ee fed  condi t ion.  The para- 
chutes maintained the reefed  condi t ion ,  after which d i s r e e f i n g  occurred,  
and a l l  three parachutes  i n f l a t e d  normally. 
crewmen were performing var ious cockpi t  t a s k s  which included the  r eac t ion  
c o n t r o l  system deple t ion  f i r i n g .  After the completion of the f i r i n g ,  t h e  
Command Module P i l o t  observed t h a t  t h e  parachute had failed.  A t  t h e  same 
t ime,  he not iced  t h e  normal brown oxid izer  cloud from the purge. 
func t ions  through landing were nominal except that the  landing w a s  harder 
than normal. 
Following t h i s  event ,  the 
Other 
RECOVERY FORCES OBSERVATIONS 
The p i l o t s  and c o p i l o t s  of t h r e e  of the recovery h e l i c o p t e r s  (Swim 2,  
Photo, and Relay) observed the  spacecraf t  between main parachute  opening 
and landing.  The loca t ions  of the  recovery fo rces  at t h e  t i m e  of the anom- 
a l y  are shown i n  figure 6. 
show that t h e  anomaly occurred at  approximately 6000 feet and tha t  the 
forward heat shield w a s  f a l l i n g  i n  c lose proximity t o  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t ,  but  
s l i g h t l y  out of p lane  from the observer 's  viewpoint. 
observed the brownish cloud and pu f f s  of white  smoke which normally occur 
during the  r e a c t i o n  con t ro l  system purge. 
The observat ions of the three he l i cop te r  crews 
The he l i cop te r  crews 
The swimmers success fu l ly  recovered one of t h e  main parachutes and 
the forward heat s h i e l d ,  although the forward hea t  s h i e l d  parachute was 
subsequently l o s t  during the  recovery operat ions.  An experienced para- 
c h u t i s t  who w a s  a member of t h e  recovery team s t a t e d  tha t  t h e  forward 
heat shield parachute  appeared t o  be i n  good condi t ion ,  with no t e a r s  i n  
t he  canopy nor broken shroud l i n e s .  
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RECOVERED PARACHUTE INSPECTION 
The recovered main parachute which had not fa i l t?d  w a s  inspec ted  and 
t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  in spec t ion  were: 
a. Nine consecutive suspension l i n e s  were cu t  approximately 1.9 feet. 
above t h e  r i se r / suspens ion- l ine  connector l i n k .  Addi t iona l ly  , some 25 
feet  of l i n e  w a s  missing from each .of  t h e  cu t  suspension l i n e s .  
were cu t  by N a @  swimmers t o  free the parachute from t h e  command module. ) 
(Lines 
b.  Gore 11 of panel  9 had a tear approximately 12 inches by 1 2  in-  
ches which d id  not appear t o  have been caused by stress o r  f r i c t i o n  burn- 
i ng ,  but probably occurred during retrieval.  
c .  Gore 55 of  pane l  5 had an 8-inch ho r i zon ta l  t e a r  which a l s o  ap- 
peared t o  be . t h e  resu l t  of r e t r i e v a l  o r  p o s t f l i g h t  handl ing operat ions 
r a t h e r  than  t h a t  of f l i g h t  damage, 
d. There were numerous small (1/16-inch t o  1/hcinch)  h o l e s . i n  t h e  
canopy. (These were probably caused by p o s t f l i g h t  handling. ) 
e .  The p i l o t  parachute  and riser were i n  exce l l en t  condi t ion ,  a n d  
t h e  main parachute deployment bag had only minimal (normal) damage. 
f .  The canopy w a s  s t a ined  with o i l  and grease.  
g. A broken r i se r / suspens ion- l ine  connector l i n k  w a s  found a f t e r  
t h e  p r o t e c t i v e  Dacron boo t i e  had been removed ( f i g .  7 ) .  
h .  Evidence of high temperature was noted on t h e  Dacron r iser pro- 
t e c t i v e  cover ( f i g .  8) and t h e  Dacron connector l i n k  boo t i e .  
FORWARD HEAT SHIELD INSPECTION 
The o v e r a l l  appearance of t he  forward hea t  s h i e l d  was cons i s t en t  
with t h a t  of t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d s  previously recovered. The heat 
s h i e l d  w a s  examined for evidence of foreign material and none w a s  f’Jund. 
The fol lowing s p e c i f i c  po in t s  were noted: 
a.  The leading  edge s e a l  was not damaged. 
b .  Parachute cable  r i s e r  marks were present  on t h e  ou t s ide  of the 
forward heat s h i e l d .  These marks occurred as a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  normal f c r -  
ward hea t  s h i e l d  parachute  deployment. 
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point 
Figure 7 .- Main parachute connector l ink failure. 
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c .  The forward hea t  s h i e l d  mortar had f i r e d  and t h e  ramp had i t s  
normal sc ra tches .  One pyrotechnic connector w a s  b e n t ,  probably as a re -  
sult of ground handling. 
d. The handra i l  had been severe ly  hea ted  and approximately 7 inches 
of  rail  w a s  missing. This condi t ion w a s  caused by reent ry  hea t ing .  
e .  The minus Z s i d e  w a s  s l i g h t l y  f l a t t e n e d  from impact with t h e  
water .  
f .  The lanyards and p ins  from t h e  forward heat  s h i e l d  switch appeared 
t o  be normal. 
g. The umbil icals  appeared t o  be normal. 
h.  A s l i c e  from t h e  base of t h e  a b l a t o r  (7  inches by 1 . 5  inches by 
0.75 inch)  on t h e  p lus  Z s i d e  was missing,  but  t he  room-temperature vul- 
canizing s e a l  was undamaged. The damage t o  t h e  a b l a t o r  w a s  probably 
caused by t h e  recovery operat ion.  
i. A l l  forward hea t  s h i e l d  t h r u s t e r s  appeared t o  have functioned 
normally from t h e  appearance of t h e  a r e a  surrounding t h e  p i s t o n  rods.  
j .  Approximately 50 inches of t h e  f a b r i c  parachute r i s e r  were s t i l l  
attached t o  t h e  s t e e l  r i s e r .  The f a b r i c  po r t ion  of t h e  forward heat  s h i e l d  
r i s e r  was cut by t h e  swimmers. 
FAILURl3 ASSESSMENT 
The inves t iga t ion  w a s  e s s e n t i a l l y  divided i n t o  t h r e e  a reas  which 
were l i k e l y  suspects  as t o  t h e  cause of t h e  parachute f a i l u r e .  
1. The forward heat  s h i e l d  w a s  suspect  because of t h e  c lose  prox- 
imity of t h e  heat  s h i e l d  t o  t h e  spacecraf t  f l i g h t  path during t h e  per iod 
when the  f a i l u r e  occurred. 
2 .  A broken r i se r / suspens ion- l ine  connector l i n k  w a s  found on t h e  
recovered parachute i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of broken l i n k s  i n  t h e  
f a i l e d  parachute. 
3. The command module r eac t ion  con t ro l  system p rope l l an t  deple t ion  
f i r i n g  had j u s t  been completed and fuel expuls ion was  i n  progress  at t h e  
time o f t h e  f a i l u r e ,  i nd ica t ing  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of damage from t h e  pro- 
pe l l an t s .  
The analyses and t e s t s  performed t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  each p o s s i b i l i t y  
a r e  presented i n  t h e  following paragraphs.  
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Forward Heat Shield 
I 
Tra jec to ry  ana lys i s . -  A t r a j e c t o r y  ana lys i s  was performed us ing  s i m -  
u l a t i o n s  t o  determine i f  t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  could have contac ted  t h e  
main parachutes .  The simulations were based on t h e  point-mass equations 
of motion, which used t h e  known mass and aerodynamic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of 
t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  and spacec ra f t  parachute systems and t h e  measured 
downrange and crossrange winds. 
The s imula t ions  and ana lys i s  showed t h a t  , at approximately 150 sec- 
onds a f t e r  t h e  24 000-foot a l t i t u d e  had been reached, t h e  spacec ra f t  and 
forward hea t  s h i e l d  were a t  t h e  same a l t i t u d e  of about 5700 f e e t  wi th  a 
miss dastance of approximately 150 f e e t .  This c o r r e l a t e s  wi th  observa- 
t i o n s  of t h e  recovery personnel.  Fur ther ,  t h e  ana lys i s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t ,  
at landing ,  t h e  spacecraf t  and t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  were about 850 feet  
a p a r t .  This agrees wi th  t h e  es t imated  separa t ion  d i s t ance  of 900 feet on 
t h e  water.  
Since t h e  wind da ta  were measured seve ra l  minutes before  landing ,  
some devia t ions  were expected. A wind p r o f i l e  wi th in  t h e  expected devi- 
a t i o n  of t 2  knots w a s  cons t ruc ted  t o  determine i f  contact between t h e  
forward hea t  s h i e l d  and command module parachute system was p o s s i b l e .  
Based on t h e  wind p r o f i l e  t r a j e c t o r y  s imula t ions ,  t h e  forward hea t  
s h i e l d  could have contacted t h e  spacecraf t  parachute  system at an a l t i tude 
near 6000 f e e t .  The inaccurac ies  i n  t h e  measured data and t h e  s imula t ions  
a re  such t h a t  it cannot be conclusively s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  contac t  d id  o r  
d id  not occur. It can only be s t a t e d  t h a t ,  i n  a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  t h e  m i s s  
d i s t ance  w a s  s m a l l .  
Photographic ana lys i s . -  A close examination of t h e  t e l e v i s i o n  record  
of spacec ra f t  descent on t h e  main parachutes e s t a b l i s h e s  t h a t  t h e  forward 
hea t  s h i e l d  w a s  below t h e  spacecraf t  at t h e  time of t h e  f a i l u r e .  Specif-  
i c a l l y ,  t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  i s  seen below t h e  spacecraf t  i n  frame 588 
( f i g .  9 )  at 295:09:11:3, approximately 2 seconds before  t h e  anomaly occur- 
red. By c o r r e l a t i o n  wi th  frame 775, which shows t h e  parachute and forward 
hea t  s h i e l d  i n  t h e  same frame at 295:09:17.5, and by d i r e c t  measurement 
of t h e  sepa ra t ion  d is tance  between t h e  two ob jec t s  and measurement of t h e  
known parachute  dimensions, t h e  v e r t i c a l  s epa ra t ion  d i s t ances  between t h e  
forward h e a t  s h i e l d  and t h e  spacecraf t  were 580 f e e t  f o r  frame 588 and 
1020 feet f o r  frame 775. 
The p o s i t i o n  of t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  guidance- 
and-navigation-estimated t r a j e c t o r y  i s  shown i n  f i g u r e  10. By extrapo- 
l a t i n g  t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  t r a j e c t o r y ,  t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  would 
have i n t e r c e p t e d  t h e  spacec ra f t  at 295:09:03. This is 10.5 seconds be- 
fo re  t h e  spacec ra f t  data i n d i c a t e  t h e  anomaly occurred. 
C-17 
Television frame 588 
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4.04 inches 
0 1 
Televis ion frame 775 
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Figure 9.-  Televis ion frame and trajectory analys is .  
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Assessment of  p r o b a b i l i t y  of forvard hea t  s h i e l d  contac t ing  s p a s -  
c r a f t . -  An assessment of t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  con- 
t a c t i n g  t h e  spacecraf t  w a s  made t o  determine t h e  hazard a s soc ia t ed  with 
contact .  
winds as a func t ion  of a l t i t u d e ,  wind v e l o c i t y ,  and d i r e c t i o n  were used 
as a bas is  f o r  t h e  s tudy.  
of t h e  spacecraf t  and forward heat  s h i e l d  i n  a p lanar  ( 2  dimensional)  
analysis  which y i e lded  t h e  frequency of occurrence of s p e c i f i c  values  Of 
range separat ion between t h e  two bodies a t  i n t e r c e p t  a l t i t u d e .  Range 
separa t ion  values of less than 100 fee t  between t h e  two veh ic l e s  were 
considered contac t .  The cumulative p r o b a b i l i t y  of contac t  i s  0.093 per- 
cen t .  This ana lys i s  considered no t r a j e c t o r y  d ispers ions .  Subsequent 
refinement of t h e  p lanar  ana lys i s  t o  include e f f e c t s  of l a t e r a l  d i sper -  
s ion  (due t o  t h e  moderate l i f t  of  t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  system and t h e  
spacecraf t  on t h e  drogue parachute)  provided a method which i s  much less  
s e n s i t i v e  t o  v a r i a t i o n  i n  i n i t i a l  condi t ions ,  p r i n c i p a l l y  i n  f l i g h t  pa th  
angle .  The re f ined  ana lys i s  a l s o  y i e l d s  a contact  p r o b a b i l i t y  of about 
0 .1  percent .  
Actual wind da ta  i n  t h e  form of frequency of occurrence of 
Wind da th  were appl ied t o  nominal t r a j e c t o r i e s  
The wind da ta  a r e  based on measurements during t h e  month of August 
over a13-year  per iod  f o r  an area near  t h e  Apollo 15 recovery zone. Wind 
frequencies were concentrated i n  t h e  eas t -nor theas t  and west-southwest di-  
r ec t ions .  These winds , and winds +22-1/2 degrees from eas t -nor theas t  and 
west-southwest, were used t o  provide a conservat ive p l ana r  wind p r o f i l e  
which permitted t h e  ana lys i s .  
The winds were used t o  nodulate  po in t  mass, z e r o r l i f t  nominal t r a c  
j e c t o r i e s  of t h e  forward heat  s h i e l d  and spacec ra f t .  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of 
t he  t r a j e c t o r i e s  a r e  shown i n  t a b l e  I .  
Forward heat  sh ie ld /parachute  suspension system impact tes ts . -  Drop 
t e s t s  were conducted t o  determine t h e  na ture  and ex ten t  of t h e  damage t o  
t h e  m a i n  parachute suspension l i n e s  and f a b r i c  risers when impacted by a 
forward heat  s h i e l d  at  simulated f l i g h t  condi t ions .  I n  t e s t s  of t h e  par-  
achute components, t h e  risers and a s soc ia t ed  l i n e s  were mounted a t  t h e  
f l i g h t  angle (38 degrees from v e r t i c a l ) ,  wi th  the  l i n e s  c o r r e c t l y  fanned 
and pre-tensioned ( f i g .  11). I n  t h e  suspension l i n e  t e s t ,  t h e  forward 
heat  sh i e ld  impacted 5 f e e t  above t h e  connector links, s t r i k i n g  a l l  22 
of t h e  l i n e s  used, breaking four  , and damaging 10 o the r s  ( f i g .  11). The 
room-temperature vulcanizing material on t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  edge was 
cut  a n d  gouged where it s t ruck  t h e  suspension l i n e s .  
Two r i se r  t e s t s  were made. I n  t h e  f i r s t ,  t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  
impacted 1-3/4 inches above t h e  f a b r i c  confluence p o i n t ,  and i n  t h e  sec- 
ond, the forward hea t  s h i e l d  impacted near  t h e  cen te r  of t h e  42-inch 
r iser  legs .  
damaging t h e  r i s e r s .  
on t h e  leading edge of t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  was gouged ( f i g .  12). 
I n  both cases ,  t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  bounced o f f  without  
However , t h e  room-temperature vulcaniz ing  material 
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TABLE I.- COMMAND MODULE/FORWARD HEAT SHIELD TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS 
I n i t i a l  Conditions 
Forward heat  s h i e l d  j e t t i s o n  
Al t i t ude ,  ft . . . . . . . . . .  23 300 
Fl ight  path angle,  deg . . . . . .  -73 1 
124 2 Dynamic pressure ,  l b / f t  . . . . .  
Spacecraft  weight, lb . . . . . . .  12 810 
Forward Heat Shield 
Weight, l b  . . . . . . . . . . . .  310 
2 Drag area ,  CDS . ft . . . . . . . .  27.75 
L i f t  coe f f i c i en t ,  CL . . . . . . .  0 
Spacecraft 
Drag area, CDS (Nominal h i s tory  f o r  twodrogue/ 
three-main-parachute operation 1 
L i f t  coe f f i c i en t ,  CL . . . . . . .  0 
Alt i tude of i n i t i a t i o n  of main 
parachute deployment, ft . , , 10 700 
Forward Heat Shield In te rcept  
Al t i tude ,  ft , , , , . , , 6 415 
Time from forward hea t  sh ie ld  
j e t t i s o n  . sec . . . . . . . . . .  135.2 
-755 a No-wind range separat ion,  f t  . , . . 
Spacecraft  downrange of forward heat  sh i e ld .  a 
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4 Forward heat shield leading edge 
Broken and damaged lines 
70 ft/sec 
Two risers Impact point 
Figure 11 .- Results of forward heat shield/suspension system impact test.  
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Figure 12.- Forward heat shield damage. 
I lcan izing 
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These tests showed t h a t  t h e  forward heat  s h i e l d  con tac t ing  <ne para- 
chute could damage some of t h e  suspension l i n e s ,  but would probably not 
cause a l o s s  of r iser l e g s .  
Forward heat  shield/command module impact tests.- Using t h e  suspen- 
s ion  l i n e / r i s e r  tes t  se tup ,  two a d d i t i o n a l  drop tests with t h e  forward 
hea t  s h i e l d  impacting t h e  spacecraf t  were performed. I n  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t ,  
t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  impacted t h e  spacecraf t  upper deck i n  t h e  minus 
Y and minus Z bays,  causing very l i g h t  sur face  damage t o  t h e  spacec ra f t ,  
bu t  severe damage t o  t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d .  I n  t h e  second t e s t ,  t h e  
forward hea t  s h i e l d  impacted t h e  spacecraf t  near  t h e  ha tch ,  breaking t h e  
ou te r  hatch window and gouging t h e  a b l a t o r .  
w a s  severly damaged. 
Again, t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  
Based on t h e  impact t es t s  and a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  worst-case damage which 
could be expected would occur i f  t h e  forward heat  s h i e l d  I.mpacted the 
crew compartment heat  s h i e l d  window. 
t h e  heat s h i e l d  window and inne r  window would be broken. 
There i s  a p o s s i b i l t t y  t h a t  bo th  
Forward hea t  sh ie ld /parachute  canopy tes t . -  A t e s t  i n  which a for- 
To simulate t h e  in-  
ward heat  s h i e l d  was dropped onto a parachute  was performed t o  assess t h e  
damage which might r e s u l t  t o  t h e  parachute  canopy. 
f l a t e d  main parachute ,  a 95-fOOt diameter polyethylene ba l loon  w a s  i n -  
f l a t e d  t o  0.2-inch of water ( t h e  dynamic pressure  during steady-state de- 
s c e n t )  with t h e  parachute placed over  t h e  bal loon and t h e  suspension l i n e s  
weighted. By using a guide cab le ,  t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  w a s  guided t o  
impact t h e  parachute canopy. The impact produced c u t t i n g ,  t e a r i n g ,  and 
burn-type damage. One parachute  r a d i a l  seam w a s  broken, another  w a s  c u t ,  
and s i x  sails  were damaged. I f  t h i s  type  of damage had been experienced 
i n  f l i g h t ,  t h e  parachute  probably would have remained i n f l a t e d  providing 
a near-nominal drag e f f e c t .  
Conclusions from forward hea t  s h i e l d  inves t iga t ions . -  The forward 
hea t  s h i e l d  w a s  not t h e  cause of t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  main parachute  based 
on two sepa ra t e  sets of data .  F i r s t ,  t h e  t e l e v i s i o n  t a p e  shows t h e  fo r -  
ward heat s h i e l d  emerging from t h e  clouds approximately 3 seconds p r i o r  
t o  t h e  anomaly. Second, t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  suspension l i n e  and r iser i m -  
pac t  t e s t s  with t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  show t h a t  s u b s t a n t i a l  damage t o  
t h e  room-temperature vulcanizing material on t h e  lead ing  edge of  t h e  fo r -  
ward heat s h i e l d  would have occurred had t h e r e  been con tac t .  The recovered 
forward hea t  s h i e l d  d id  not have t h i s  type  of damage. There w a s  no evi-  
dence of heat  s h i e l d  contac t  with t h e  parachute .  
Both t h e  t r a j e c t o r y  ana lys i s  and t h e  t e l e v i s i o n  and observer  d a t a  
show t h a t  t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  d i d  come c lose  t o  t h e  spacec ra f t .  The 
ana lys i s  p red ic t s  t h a t  , f o r  f u t u r e  f l i g h t s  , probabi l i ty-of-contact  i s  less 
than 1 i n  1000. I n  add i t ion ,  t h e  t es t s  of t h e  forward hea t  s h i e l d  impact- 
i n g  the suspension and r i se r  l i n e s ,  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t ,  and t h e  canopy, i nd i -  
c a t e  t h a t  , should contac t  occu'i-, t h e  r e s u l t i n g  damage i;ould not be ca tas -  
t rophic .  Therefore,  Sased on t h e  low p r o b a b i l i t y  of c o n t a c t ,  and t h e  
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acceptable damage should the  heat s h i e l d  contact the spacec ra f t  and i t s  
parachute system, no co r rec t ive  ac t ion  i s  requi red .  1 
I Riser/Suspension Line Connector Links 
I One 
chute f a i l e d .  
I gen embrit t lement,  o r  some unknown mechanism, S t r e s s  cor ros ion  i s  a pos- 
s i b l e  cause because t h e  high-strength s t e e l  (4130) used i n  t h e  links l 
i s  s u s c e p t i b l e  at high s t r e s s  l e v e l s  t o  cracking i n  salt water.  Hydrogen 
embrittlement i s  a p o s s i b i l i t y  because of t h e  s u s c e p t i b i l i t y  of t h e  high- 
s t r e n g t h  s t e e l  t o  cracking from disso lved  hydrogen. 
program, s tuds  which were not proper ly  processed a f t e r  p l a t i n g  f a i l e d  be- 
cause of hydrogen embrit t lement.  
s t u d  i n  a connector l i n k  assembly on t h e  Apollo 1 5  recovered para- 
The f a i l u r e  w a s  caused by s t r e s s  cor ros ion  c racking ,  hydro- 
E a r l i e r  i n  t h e  Apollo 
Link t e s t i n q . -  Severa l  t e s t s  were performed on t h e  connector links. 
The r e s u l t s  a r e  discussed i n  t h e  following paragraphs: 
Sustained-load t e s t :  Two l i n k  assemblies were s u s t a i n  loaded i n  
t e n s i o n ,  a x i a l l y  along t h e  s t u d s ,  t o  a s t r e s s  of 132 000 p s i  at t h e  minor 
diameter of t h e  s t u d  th reads .  The t e s t  was t o  r evea l  t h e  presence of hy- 
drogen embr i t t l ed  m a t e r i a l ;  however , t h e  t e s t e d  l i n k s  had been exposed 
t o  salt  wa te r ,  and t h e r e f o r e ,  th i s  t e s t  was not s u f f i c i e n t  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  
between delayed f a i l u r e  from salt-water immersion o r  hydrogen. 
I The f i r s t  specimen f a i l e d  7.6 hours a f t e r  load a p p l i c a t i o n .  The 
f r a c t u r e  su r face  had approximately twonthirds of t h e  cross  s e c t i o n a l  a r e a  
a t  t h e  s t u d  shoulder exposed t o  a cor ros ive  environment (probably s e a  
wa te r )  p r i o r  t o  t h e  start  of t h e  t e a t .  
i 
I 
The second l i n k  specimen f a i l e d  48.9 hours a f t e r  load a p p l i c a t i o n .  
I This  specimen d i d  not have t h e  l a r g e  pre-corroded a rea  observed on the 
first specimen; however, approximately 10  percent  of t h e  c ross -sec t ion  
had cor ros ion  p resen t .  The sustained-load induced-fracture a r e a  was duc- 
1 t i l e  on both specimens. 
I 
S t r e s s  cor ros ion  t e s t s  : Four s t u d s  from the  recovered parachute  
links ( l o t  U )  were loaded t o  a stress of 132 000 p s i  i n  t ens ion  at t h e  
minimum s e c t i o n  of t h e  s tuds .  Three of t hese  s tuds  were notched, and 
t h e  fou r th  specimen was t e s t e d  i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  conf igura t ion .  
specimens survived 200 hours of sus ta ined  load i n  air. 
s e a  water  w a s  placed i n  contact wi th  t h e  notched a rea  of two of t h e  s tuds  
and t h e  load  w a s  maintained f o r  an add i t iona l  48 hours.  
specimen remained i n  sus t a ined  load  as a con t ro l  specimen. 
s i d e s  of t h e  notches exposed t o  sa l t  water were h ighly  corroded, no fail- 
ure  occurred. The unnotched specimen was removed a f t e r  200 hours of sus- 
t a i n e d  load  i n  air  and inspec ted  under 25-power magnif icat ion f o r  cracks 
A l l  four  
Af t e r  200 hours ,  
The t h i r d  notched 
Although t h e  
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and none were observed. This unnotched s tud  w a s  then remounted i n  a l i n k  
assembly, torqued t o  120 in - lb ,  which i s  twice s p e c i f i c a t i o n  l e v e l ,  and 
placed in  s e a  water f o r  24 hours .  
disassembled, and examined f o r  cracks.  No cracks were found. 
The l i n k s  and s tuds  were then a i r  d r i e d ,  
Eight add i t iona l  s tuds  were torqued t o  200 in- lb  i n  o rde r  t o  simu- 
Two s tuds  f a i l e d  during exposure t o  s e a  water, thus  confirming 
l a t e  the  e f f e c t  of t o l e rance  bui ldup of stresses at  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  torque  
l e v e l s .  
t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  of genera t ing  salt-water-induced stress cor ros ion  crack- 
ing  if the p a r t s  are wi th in  drawing l i m i t s .  
Tensi le  t e s t s :  Two l o t  T s t u d s ,  which had not been exposed t o  Salt  
water, were placed under load  as s tuds  t o  a stress l e v e l  of 132 000 p s i ,  
as computed f o r  t h e  minor diameter of t h e  s t u d  th reads .  This stress w a s  
maintained f o r  200 hours i n  an a i r  environment. The stress w a s  maintained 
while sea  water w a s  p laced i n  contact  with t h e  s t r e s s e d  th reads .  After 
48 hours,  t h e  sea water was allowed t o  dry and t h e  specimen w a s  maintained 
under load f o r  an add i t iona l  24 hours.  
men was examined under 25-power magnif icat ion.  Both specimens were then  
pu l l ed  t o  f a i lu re  i n  t ens ion ,  a f te r  e x h i b i t i n g  y i e l d i n g ,  at 254 000 p s i  
(normal notch s t rengthening  f o r  t h i s  m a t e r i a l ) .  No evidence of pre-ex- 
i s t i n g  f l a w s  or corrosion was found on t h e  f r a c t u r e  su r face .  
No cracks were found when t h e  spec i -  
A t o t a l  o f  t e n  s tuds  (two each from: a pack l i f e  parachute ,  l o t  U 
t h a t  had not  been flown, and recovered parachutes  used on Apollo 1 0 ,  1 2 ,  
and 13) were loaded i n  tens ion  t o  132 000 p s i  as ca l cu la t ed  f o r  t h e  minor 
diameter of t h e  th reads .  No f a i l u r e s  occurred i n  t h e  accumulated 150 
hours of a i r  exposure t e s t  t i m e  on each specimen. 
Two o the r  t e s t s  were performed t o  provide b a s e d i n e  d a t a  on s t u d  
f a i l u r e s .  
placed under a n e t  s ec t ion  stress load  of 132 000 p s i .  The s t u d  f a i l e d  
i n  30 minutes and thus  va l ida t ed  t h e  hydrogen embrit t lement sc reening  
t e s t .  The second t e s t  used l o t  R links t h a t  had o r i g i n a l l y  been r e j e c t e d  
due t o  hydrogen embri t t lement .  These l i n k s  were t e s t e d  t o  132 000 p s i  
fo r  200 hour s  without f a i l u r e  , i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  hydrogen embr i t t l e -  
men t charac t e r i  s t i cs had decay ea .  
An Apollo 10 s tud  was purposely charged with wdrogen  and 
The r e s u l t s  of  me ta l lu rg ica l  examinations and these  t e s t s  support  
t he  following conclusions : 
1. Physical  evidence f o r  hydrogen-induced delayed f a i l u r e s  of l o t  
U and l o t  T s tuds  does not now e x i s t  b u t ,  due t o  t h e  long e lapsed  t i m e  
s ince  p l a t ing ,  hydrogen-induced f a i l u r e  cannot be r u l e d  o u t .  
2. Sea water does not induce cracks at t h e  times and nominal stress 
l eve l s  expected, although genera l  r u s t i n g  of exposed s t e e l  occurs r a p i d l y .  
S t r e s s  corrosion cracks can be induced by exposure t o  sa l t  water at 
stress l eve l s  h igher  than those  expected f o r  a nominal 60 in- lb  torque .  
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i 3. For t h e  f a i l ed  studs,  the flaws probably occurred a f te r  t h e  
p l a t i n g  opera t ion .  
P u l l  t e s t s :  A series of connector l i n k  p u l l  t es t s  were conducted. 
An Apollo l i n k  which had been preloaded (nu t s  to rqued)  f o r  more than  2 
I The recovered Apollo 1 5  connector l i n k  with t h e  sepa ra t ed  s t u d  w a s  
f i t t e d  wi th  a riser and suspension l i n e s  and p u l l  t es ted  t o  eva lua te  i t s  
c a p a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  three-nut  conf igura t ion .  
could c a r r y  load.  This l i n k  w a s  successfu l ly  subjec ted  t o  two complete 
f l i g h t  l oad  cyc le s ,  t hen  t h e  load  w a s  increased t o  5000 pounds (which cor- 
The l i n k  had fa i led i n  t h e  
I 
I s tud  th read  and t h e  s t u d  had a shoulder  remaining i n  t h e  end p l a t e  which 
responds t o  canopy ult imate s t r e n g t h )  and success fu l ly  he ld  f o r  2 minutes.  
These t e s t s  demonstrated t h a t  t h e  stud f a i l u r e  could have occurred p r i o r  
I s t u d s .  This l i n k  f a i l e d  at 1300 pounds, a value below t h e  opening loads 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i t o  parachute  deployment. 
s imula t ing  a t e n s i l e  failure of one s tud  at  t h e  shoulder ,  o r  two sheared 
bu t  h igher  than t h e  s teady-s ta te  loads .  
A f i n a l  t e s t  was made with one end p l a t e  removed, 
Rel iab i l i ty  and q u d i t y  assurance records review.- A review was made 
I of  t h e  manufacturing and inspec t ion  h i s t o r y  records of  t h e  parachute  l i n k  
assembly manufactured by Northrop Ventura. 
North American Rockwell, Downey, Cal i forn ia ;  Metal Surfaces ,  Inc .  , B e l l  
Gardens , Cal i fo rn ia ;  and Northrop Ventura, Thousand Oaks, Cal i fo rn ia .  
Records were researched a t  
The records show t h a t  t h e  p a r t s  for  Apollo 1 5  ( l o t  Q p l a t e s ,  and 
l o t  U s t u d s )  and Apollo 16 ( l o t  W p l a t e s  and s t u d s )  were proper ly  pro- 
cessed i n  accordance with t h e  la tes t  rev is ion  of t h e  Northrop p l a t i n g  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  
One s i g n i f i c a n t  i t e m  d i sc losed  by the  review was t h a t  l o t  R s tuds  
which should have been scrapped were accepted and i n s t a l l e d  i n  f l i g h t  par- 
achutes .  
i n s t a l l e d  i n  a parachute  t o  be used f o r  f u t u r e  f l i g h t .  
Lot R s tuds  were'flown i n  one parachute on Apollo 14, and were 
Parachute  tow tes ts . -  A series of ground tow tes ts  w a s  conducted t o  
eva lua te  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  i n f l a t e d  parachute  arid riser load  re- 
sponse r e s u l t i n g  from severing one, two, and t h r e e  riser l egs  of a fully 
i n f l a t e d  main parachute.  I n f l a t i o n  w a s  obtained by towing t h e  parachute 
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i n t o  the wind. When t h e  canopy w a s  f u l l y  i n f l a t e d  and s tab le ,  s e l e c t e d  
risers were pyrotechnical ly  severed. Ind iv idua l  riser l e g  loads ,  t o t a l  
r i s e r  load ,  and photographic documentation were obtained.  
When one of t h e  s i x  r iser l egs  w a s  severed,  t h e  canopy remained f u l l y  
i n f l a t e d  and, i n  approximately 2 seconds,  exhib i ted  f u l l  riser load .  When 
two adjacent  r iser l e g s  w e r e  severed,  t h e  canopy co l lapsed  but did  cont inue 
t o  provide a drag fo rce  of approximately one-third t h e  f u l l y  i n f l a t e d  V s l U e .  
Three risers were severed i n  t h e  t h i r d  t e s t ;  two vere ad jacent  and t h e  t h i r d  
w a s  separated from them by a good r i se r  l e g .  When t h e  r i s e r s  were severed ,  
t h e  canopy co l lapsed ,  with t h e  por t ion  opposi te  t h e  severed r isers holding 
a i r  fo r  s e v e r a l  seconds. The load  h i s t o r i e s  f o r  each of t h e  t h r e e  t es t s  
are shown i n  f igu re  13. The i n i t i a l  load  drop f o r  t h e  one-, two-, and 
th ree - r i s e r  t e s t  w a s  600, 1700, and 2300 l b ,  r e spec t ive ly .  
These tes ts  ind ica t ed  t h a t  t h e  Apollo main parachute w i l l  remain 
f u l l y  i n f l a t e d  and provide normal drag with one of i t s  s i x  r i s e r  l egs  sev- 
ered.  When two or more adjacent  r iser l e g s  are severed,  t he  canopy w i l l  
co l lapse ,  and l o s e  a t  l e a s t  two-thirds of i t s  load-carrying c a p a b i l i t y .  
Conclusions from connector l i n k  inves t iga t ions  .- The f a i l e d  l i n k  on 
t h e  recovered parachute implies  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a similar occurrence 
on the  f a i l e d  parachute .  However, t h e  parachute tow t e s t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
a s ingle  l i n k  f a i l u r e  would not have caused t h e  load change (approximately 
1300 pounds) determined from t h e  spacecraf t  da t a .  Although t h e  l i n k  f a i l -  
ure  i s  not be l ieved  t o  have caused t h e  parachute  anomaly, a complete rec- 
ords review and a mater ia l s  t e s t  program were performed t o  determine t h e  
cause of t h e  flaws. The records show t h a t  t h e  Apollo 15 l o t  l i n k s  were 
processed i n  accordance with a l l  requirements.  The l i n k  t e s t s  showed 
t h a t  the broken l i n k  can car ry  t h e  f l i g h t  loads ( i n  t h e  case of Apollo 1 5  
type b reak ) .  
b r i t  tlement o r  salt-water-induced s t  r e s  s cor ros ion  at  h i  gher-than-expected 
s t r e s s  l e v e l s  as the  poss ib l e  cause of  t h e  f a i l u r e .  In  f a c t ,  t h e  cause 
of t he  flaw i s  not known. 
The ava i l ab le  evidence cannot r u l e  out e i t h e r  hydrogen em-  
Command Module Reaction Control System 
The cormand module r eac t ion  con t ro l  system w a s  considered as a poss i -  
b l e  cause of t h e  anomaly f o r  t h e  fol lowing reasons :  
a. The propel lan t  deple t ion  f i r i n g  terminated 3.5 seconds before  t h e  
spacecrafb r a t e s  gave evidence of a major d i s turbance .  The excess f u e l  
expulsion which followed t h e  deple t ion  f i r i n g  w a s  s t i l l  i n  progress  a t  t h e  
time of  f a i l u r e .  
b. The damaged parachute he ld  a p o s i t i o n  genera l ly  above t h e  minus 
Y r o l l  engines while t h e  f u e l  expuls ion was i n  progress .  
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Figure 13 .- Parachute tow test loads. 
C-29 
c.  Burning f u e l  can cause damage t o  t h e  r isers,  suspension l i n e s ,  
o r  parachute canopy. 
d. Evidence of mel t ing w a s  found on t h e  Dacron p r o t e c t i v e  covering 
of the  f a b r i c  r i s e r  and t h e  connector links on t h e  recovered parachute  
ass emb l y  . 
System Operation.- Both command module r eac t ion  con t ro l  systems were 
ac t iva t ed  normally a t  294:07:14. Both systems were used during en t ry  as 
opposed t o  previous missions where one system w a s  tu rned  o f f  p r i o r  t o  e n t r y .  
System performance during t h e  con t ro l l ed  po r t ion  of en t ry  w a s  nomind as 
ve r i f i ed  by pressure  and temperature d a t a  and from spacecraf t  rates pro- 
duced by commanded engine f i r i n g s .  
The command module r eac t ion  con t ro l  system con t ro l  f i r i n g s  were t e r -  
minated normally a t  295 :06:44 when t h e  systems were e l e c t r i c a l l y  d i sab led .  
A t  t h i s  po in t  i n  t h e  mission,  t h e  engines had been f i r e d  approximately 
680 times and t h e  t o t a l  f i r i n g  t i m e  was about 160 seconds. The p rope l l an t  
usage had been 20 pounds of f u e l  and 36 pounds of ox id i ze r ,  d iv ided  equal ly  
between t h e  two systems. Propel lan t  consumption w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by pres-  
su re ,  temperature,  and volume ca l cu la t ions  and confirmed by t h e  summation 
of the engine f i r i n g  t imes .  Usable p rope l l an t  remaining at 295 :06 :44 , 
p r i o r  t o  the  s tar t  of t h e  deple t ion  f i r i n g ,  w a s  30 pounds of f u e l  and 53 
pounds of ox id izer  i n  each system f o r  a t o t a l  of 60 pounds of f u e l  and 
106 pounds of ox id i ze r .  Tota l  p rope l l an t  remaining, inc luding  t h e  t rapped  
p rope l l an t s ,  was 69 pounds of  f u e l  and 120 pounds of ox id i ze r .  
The command module r eac t ion  c o n t r o l  system deple t ion  f i r i n g  w a s  man- 
u a l l y  i n i t i a t e d  at 295:08:22. 
interconnected by opening squib valves  between t h e  helium manifolds , t h e  
fue l  manifolds, and t h e  ox id ize r  manifolds.  The engine valves on a l l  bu t  
t he  two p lus  p i t c h  engines were a l s o  opened using t h e  d i r e c t  c o i l s .  Sys- 
tem pressures  ind ica t ed  t h a t  t h e  deple t ion  f i r i n g  w a s  normal wi th  ox id ize r  
deplet ion at 295:09:10. Fuel deple t ion  followed 4.7 seconds l a t e r .  These 
times were confirmed by ca l cu la t ions  us ing  t h e  p rope l l an t  remaining p r i o r  
t o  the f i r i n g ,  and a mixture r a t i o  and p rope l l an t  flow r a t e  commensurate 
w i t h  s teady-state  f i r i n g  from 10 engines .  Between t h e  time of ox id i ze r  de- 
p l e t ion  and f u e l  dep le t ion ,  about 7 pounds of r a w  f’uel were being expel led  
During t h i s  f i r i n g ,  t h e  two systems were 
The command module r eac t ion  con t ro l  system l i n e  purge opera t ion  was 
manually i n i t i a t e d  a t  295:09:22. This opera t ion  opened four  squib valves  
t h a t  enabled t h e  helium gas t o  bypass t h e  p rope l l an t  tanks and purge t h e  
res idua l  or  t rapped p rope l l an t s  from t h e  system manifold l i n e s .  Regulated 
helium pressure  and helium source pressure  d a t a  v e r i f i e d  a normal purge 
operat ion.  A t  295:09:25 and 295:09:28, colored clouds ,were seen coming 
from the spacec ra f t .  This i s  normal and i s  caused by t h e  expuls ion of 
unburned oxid izer  through t h e  engines by t h e  purge operati .on.  Unburned 
f i e 1  is  a l s o  of ten  seen about t h i s  t ime i n  t h e  form of a white  cloud. 
C-30 
P o s t f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  of t h e  command module r e a c t i o n  c o n t r o l  system 
showed it t o  be  i n  normal working order .  Tes t ing  inc luded  leak checks 
of t h e  p rope l l an t  tank  b l adde r s ,  engine valve leak t e s t s ,  engine valve 
s igna tu re  t r a c e s  t o  v e r i f y  proper  opening c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  and e l e c t r o n i c  
t e s t s  t o  v e r i f y  the  e l e c t r i c a l  wi r ing  and t e rmina l  board connections.  
Command module r e a c t i o n  con t ro l  system f u e l  expuls ion tests.- Two 
tests were performed t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  of a r a w  f u e l  
expulsion on t h e  parachutes : 
The f i r s t  t e s t  w a s  a f e a s i b i l i t y  demonstration t o  determine i f  f u e l  
sprayed on t h e  parachute  risers and suspension l i n e s  would burn ,  assuming 
t h a t  t h e r e  could be  an i g n i t i o n  source.  A simple nozzle w a s  used t o  spray  
r a w  f u e l  i n t o  a 30 f’t/sec air  stream and onto a sample of t h e  r i s e r  and 
suspension l i n e s ,  p a r t  of which was surrounded by a Dacron b o o t i e .  Hot- 
w i r e  i g n i t i o n  sources were imbedded i n  t h e  b o o t i e  and r i s e r  t o  simulate 
an i n f l i g h t  i g n i t i o n  source.  These tests demonstrated t h a t ,  above c e r t a i n  
th re sho ld  f u e l  concent ra t ion  l e v e l s ,  t h e  fie1 on t h e  boo t i e s  would burn i n  
a wick-like manner. 
due t o  mel t ing of t h e  nylon material. 
This r e s u l t e d  i n  r i s e r  and suspension l i n e  f a i l u r e s  
The second tes t  cons i s t ed  of f i r i n g  a command module r e a c t i o n  c o n t r o l  
system engine followed by fuel cold flow (simulated f u e l  expuls ion) .  
w a s  performed t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  e f f e c t s  of cold flowing r a w  f’uel through 
a hot  engine. 
minus-pitch nozzle ex tens ion  were mounted h o r i z o n t a l l y  i n  an ambient t es t  
c e l l .  There w a s  no attempt t o  simulate the  r e l a t i v e  air v e l o c i t y  surround- 
i n g  a descending command module. The t e s t  f i r i n g s  cons i s t ed  of a series 
of ho t  f i r i n g s  of 10 t o  45 seconds i n  dura t ion ,  each followed by a 5 ~ s e c o n d  
fuel cold flow (about 0.6 pound of f’uel). 
pu ls ion  sequence produced burning outs ide  of t h e  engine. 
vapor, burning f u e l  d r o p l e t s ,  and some unburned fuel were observed during 
t h e s e  t e s t s .  
p lane  and unburned f’uel was sprayed up t o  10 f e e t  from t h e  engine and then  
i g n i t e d  by burning d r o p l e t s .  
It 
For t h e s e  t e s t s ,  a r eac t ion  c o n t r o l  system engine and a 
I n  every case ,  t h e  raw f u e l  ex- 
Burning fuel 
The flame f r o n t  e x i s t e d  up t o  8 feet from t h e  engine e x i t  
Conclusions from r e a c t i o n  con t ro l  system inves t iKat ions . -  A s  a result 
of t h e s e  t es t s ,  t h e  hazard of a raw f u e l  expuls ion was demonstrated. 
a d d i t i o n ,  s ince  t h e  f a i l e d  parachute  was  pos i t i oned  over ,the r o l l  engines 
f o r  t h e  t i m e  pe r iod  J u s t  p r i o r  t o  the anomaly, t h e  e f f e c t s  noted i n  t h e  
second tes t  were, most l i keJy ,  t h e  cause of t h e  Apollo 1 5  parachute  f a i l u r e .  
I n  
CON CLUS IONS 
The a n a l y s i s  of t h e  d a t a  and r e s u l t s  of t h e  s p e c i a l  tests l e a d  t o  t h e  
following conclusions: 
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a .  The most probable cause of t h e  anomaly was -the burning o f  r a w  
f u e l  (monomethyl hydrazine) being expel led  dur ing  t h e  l a t te r  p o r t i o n  of 
t h e  deple t ion  f i r i n g  and t h i s  r e s u l t e d  i n  exceeding t h e  parachute- r i se r  
and suspension-line temperature l i m i t s .  
b. The forward hea t  s h i e l d  passed extremely c l o s e  t o  t h e  command 
module during t h e  descent phase; however, at t h e  t i m e  of t h e  anomaly, 
t h e  heat s h i e l d  was 700 feet  below t h e  command module. 
e .  Impact of t h e  forward heat s h i e l d  on t h e  paxachute risers, SUS- 
pension l i n e s  , canopy, or spacecraf t  w i l l  not cause ca t a s t roph ic  damge.  
d .  The f a i l u r e  of a s i n g l e  connector l i n k  w i l l  not cause a m a i n  
parachute  t o  fa i l .  
e. The flaw observed i n  t h e  recovered parachute  connector l i n k  prob- 
ab ly  occurred a f t e r  t h e  p l a t i n g  ope ra t ion ,  and could be  due e i t h e r  t o  salt-  
water-induced stress cor ros ion  or hydrogen embrit t lement.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION 
Corrective a c t i o n s  for  t h e  r eac t ion  c o n t r o l  system include landing 
with t h e  p rope l l an t s  onboard f o r  a normal landing  and b i a s i n g  t h e  pro- 
p e l l a n t  load t o  provide a s l i g h t  excess of o x i d i z e r .  Thus, f o r  t h e  low- 
a l t i t u d e  abor t  l and  landing  c a s e ,  burning t h e  p r o p e l l a n t s  while on t h e  
parachutes w i l l  sub jec t  t h e  parachutes t o  some acceptab le  o x i d i z e r  damage 
but  w i l l  e l imina te  t h e  dangerous b i r n i n g  f u e l  condi t ion .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e  t i m e  de lay  which i n h i b i t s  t h e  r a p i d  p rope l l an t  dump i s  be ing  changed 
from 42 t o  61 seconds. 
lant w i l l  not have t o  be  burned through t h e  r e a c t i o n  con t ro l  system en- 
g ines  i n  t h e  event of a l and  landing .  
This will provide more assurance t h a t ' t h e  propel-  
The design of t h e  suspension l i n e  connector l i n k s  has been modified 
t o  preclude t h e  development of high stress l e v e l s  due t o  torque l e v e l s  
and t o  reduce t h e  unce r t a in ty  of loads  due t o  t o l e r a n c e  buildup. 
material has been changed t o  Inconel 718 t o  e l imina te  t h e  requirement f o r  
p l a t i n g  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of hydrogen embrit t lement.  
a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  l i n k  s tud threads  a r e  r o i l e d  r a t h e r  than  machined t o  improve 
me ta l lu rg ica l  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  m a t e r i a l  , and t h e  s tuds  a r e  subjec ted  t o  
a proof t e s t  designed t o  screen f l a w s  which could subsequent ly  propagate 
under s a l t  water exposure. 
The l i n k  
In 
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